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Anup Pahari/From liberation to insurgency: The
politics of paradoxes in Nepal, 1990-2003
In the present situation in Nepal two paradoxes
can be identified:
a) Why did an armed Maoist struggle/movement gain
attraction so fast and so quickly since 1990,
the period of greatest political openness and
not in the four decades earlier when Nepal was
ruled autocratically and the geopolitics favoured
such a movement?
b) Why did a revolutionary left agenda gain momentum
in Nepal at precisely the historical moment when
the critical mass of the Nepali Left movement
accepted a non-revolutionary democratic path to
power and was in the process of establishing a
lasting electoral hold in power and all its implications
for a left agenda?
This is not a protest or a grievance but a full-blown
textbook Maoist insurgency, if we look at the
language it has used and the tactics it has employed.
Between 1945 and 1983 of the 22 countries that
went through a full-blown socialist Maoist/Marxist
revolution not a single one of them had democracy
in place. Nepal was like Peru which a Maoist movement
in a country moving towards a democratic transition.
We have to ask ourselves not why we have a Maoist
insurgency but why do we have Maoist insurgency
in the midst of a collective democratic effort.
Left insurgencies take place against colonisation
or if there is a vilified ruler but there was
neither in Nepal in 1996. So we need to look at
what the 1990 movement was. The 1990 movement
was conceived by political parties, it was not
a grassroots movement with the participation of
the rural populace. It was a movement that succeeded
in putting in place a key framework, a democratic
polity and constitutional monarchy. It did not
rout the ancien regime though the old guard was
significantly weakened. It brought about liberation
among political parties, their leadership, their
cadre, members of the civil society—students,
journalists and urban professionals. It was not
a movement that brought about liberation to those
at the bottom of the Nepali society.
Why was the democratic system vulnerable to
insurgency? The polity had to be depicted as something
else in order for it to be vulnerable to Maoist
assault on it. The Maoist were not able to assault
it directly as a democracy and they have never
accepted that it was a full-fledged democracy.
Assault on democracy begins at two levels—one
is the external assault that is the Maoist assault
the other is internal, the self-inflicted wounds
of the insurgency. The external assault by the
Maoist is vilification that the system is undemocratic
and fundamentally nothing has changed since 1990.
Democracy was destroyed in language by the Maoists.
The internal assault was that the Maoists set
a political ideological trap and the state fell
right into it. They argued for its inherent undemocratic
character and it did so by two methods—by
tampering with the fundamentals of what defines
a democracy. So the Maoists argued that the state
was undemocratic and at crucial moments the state
acted undemocratically and proved the Maoists
right. It did not do so universally, but did it
in enough places and enough times to convince
a key sector in Nepali society that the regime
was undemocratic indeed. There was no democracy
that the Maoists were up against, it was less
than democracy.
A question why there wasn’t a movement
from autocracy of the Panchayat to revolution?
Why was there a democracy in the interim. The
answer may lie in that the opposition to Panchayat
autocracy always said that the answer was democracy
not revolution despite the fact that Nepal has
had a vibrant left movement since the Second World
War, even in the darkest days of the Panchayat.
The coming of democracy has eased the argument
for revolution since the oppression was collective.
Once that equality of oppression was removed in
1990 it was the inequality of political party
fortunes. A theoretical democracy is hard to attack.
The Maoist had it easier to attack a real democracy
rather than a theoretical democracy. The Maoists
showed that the real democracy was not a real
democracy.
Looking at the second paradox, one needs to
look at the role of the left ideology which was
not strong enough in the left movement. UML has
gone through a series of changes between 1975
and 1990 and it accepted constitutional monarchy
without a constituent assembly, thus bringing
the left to the centre. Contrast this with the
other ideology of fight against revision as highlighted
by Comrade Prachanda. With the rise of Pajero
communism in Nepal and corruption, the UML proved
the Maoists right. There has also been a series
of failure in reform, redistribution and growth.
This again lays emphasis on the role of the ideology
as fundamental as no common cause can be found
between a viable left and an aspiring left.
Dealing with transformation, questions also
arise about whether it is good or bad for the
interests of the ethnic groups to migrate to the
Maoists and abandon or question participation
in mainstream political parties. Is it viable
in the long run? Is the Maoist movement a long-term
viable vehicle for their expression and realisation
of ethnic rights and equality, etc? Or will this
vehicle swallow this for its own purpose?
Questions
1. Wasn’t it a failure of development, the
ideology of development that has occupied the
minds of the leaders after 1990?
2. Among the many lapses the major lapse was
that the democratic parties did not go to the
grassroots. Policy and posts were important and
the Maoists were smart enough to take advantage
of this vacuum. Second, some regard must also
be given to the experience of the Maoists political
wing—the Samyukta Jana Morcha—in the
parliament. They tried to introduce changes that
were completely unheard of by the mainstream political
parties. That was also partly to blame.
3. Maoists are championing the cause of janjatis,
madhesis and women’s groups, right to self
determination. The Maoists support federal structure.
Do you think these Maoists will be able solve
the expectations of the janjatis on the basis
of the experience so far?
4. The ethnic minorities issues and Maoist movement
are joining forces. This is a wrong interpretation
as the ethnic question predates the Maoist movement.
It is just a strategy of the Maoists. Prachanda
says that the tribal groups are emancipated and
therefore we trust them more, they are fighters.
The Maoists have co-opted the already existing
issues. Insurgency will therefore not be the leading
ethnic movement in Nepal.
5. When the Maoist movement started most of
the communities were tribal in nature which was
exploited by the Panchayat and the Congress also
exploited it. There were the tribal norms and
values but those of the nation-state were imposed.
Most of the ethnic groups and peoples are in deprivation.
Almost 71 percent of the those under the poverty
line are from the indigenous group. Class concept
is very much relevant to the ethnic groups. They
are suppressed and not given autonomy. But Maoists
say that they will be given autonomy so they are
attracted to the Maoists.
Answers
1. If you go through the paper I have addressed
the failure of distribution and growth in conjunction
with reform. I take that to include failure in
development and socio-economic outcome.
2. In answer to the second question I would
like to quote from my paper: ‘Over the past
12 years, the Maoists have understood the weakest
links of the Nepali electoral democracy. The weakest
links are at the margins—regional margins,
ethnic-state margins, caste margins and ethnic
margins. And this is precisely where the insurgency
is burning at its hottest.’ This has been
documented. I by no means wanted to ignore that.
There is also the acknowledgement that a large
part of the population mobilised by the Maoists
was never successfully brought under the fold
of any major political party. The point about
Samyukta Jan Morcha is well taken although I would
question the strategy to take up arms. More time
should have been given to change.
3. Where will the Maoist and ethnic question
go? Lenin made all sorts of promises to soviet
republics but look at what happened to those promises.
It took the collapse of the Berlin Wall for the
ethnic issues to be revived after 70 years. The
Chinese were not quite as unmindful as the Russians
were. So they use the term soviet social imperialism.
But try telling that to the Tibetans that the
Chinese have been kind to the Tibetans. This is
a marriage of convenience.
4. On the ethnic grievances and the Maoist movement,
the relationship is so deep seated that the underlying
relationship is a complex relation.
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