 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| |
| |
| |
|
Summary of paper presentations made
at the conference
The Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali
Democracy
organised by
Social Science Baha
24-26 April, 2003
Friday, 25 April
Morning, Gauri Hall
Session: Social, cultural and economic
exclusion II
Chair: Anup Pahari
Presenters: Judith Pettigrew
David Gellner
Bishnu Raj Upreti
* * *
Judith Pettigrew/Ethno-Political Concerns
of Rural Gurung Women
Judith Pettigrew's paper considered the question
of social inclusion within ethnic organisations,
as viewed by rural Gurungs, and compared their
responses with the opinions of urban ethnic elites.
In her presentation, she discussed her latest
findings from conversations with rural Gurung
women, especially those of middle age who are
active in a village women's committee. Pettigrew
argued that in her study area (a village within
the Annapurna Conservation Area Project [ACAP]
region), women were renegotiating the political
space available to them.
Interviewed on issues of political, social and
cultural and economic inclusion, the women expressed
strong views. They said there was a need for positive
discrimination in political institutions, the
inclusion of the Gurung language at the national
level on par with Nepali, the elimination of cultural
and religious discrimination, and of discrimination
in economic participation as job opportunities
for Gurungs remain limited. They said that while
the income effects of economic exclusion may be
partially mitigated by the jobs afforded to the
community in the British and Indian armies, employment
in foreign armies poses other problems of inclusion.
Exploring the linkages between rural Gurung
women and the (largely) urban male ethnic activists
who represent their concerns, Pettigrew found
a high degree of coherence in the concerns of
the former as articulated in the demands of the
latter. But, while the women empathised with the
activists on larger ethnic issues, they felt a
sense of grievance in cases of gender-specific
representation.
Attributing their growing awareness of their
political potential to the ACAP, they saw the
project as having encouraged them to discover
their capabilities to organise, to run committees
and to lead 'just as well as men'. They said that
they had needed to be trained and given direction,
to be encouraged and included in decision-making,
which is what the ACAP provided. Now, they feel
that positive discrimination in decision-making
bodies should be extended to gender-specific positive
discrimination. There is a tension here with janjati
activists, who believe that they represent fairly
the interests of women, and that gender discrimination,
in fact, does not exist in the ethnic communities.
But Pettigrew finds that in normative practices
of prescribed behaviour and constraints of the
marriage system-which are internalised and perpetuated
by women-women are largely excluded from decision-making
roles in the public arena. Comparing a Pokhara-based
Gurung organisation, where women are involved
at the fund-raising and support level, with the
women in her village field-site, she discerned
a difference in attitude. While the women who
had been trained by the ACAP were beginning to
lay claim to greater political space (even though
for now this is limited to women-only organisations),
the middle aged householder women she spoke to
in Pokhara had not questioned their non-decision
making roles.
Pettigrew ended with the prescription that the
janjati elites need to further address the question
of inclusiveness.
* * *
David Gellner/Inclusion, hybridity,
social order: Preconditions of democracy
David Gellner’s paper dealt with the politics
of inclusion from an ethnographic perspective.
Delving into the question of how to develop a
legitimate, liberal, democratic state in Nepal,
he said that it was essential to enhance its inclusiveness
of dalits and janjatis. This, while being a well-recognised
fact, is seen as threatening for elite (Bahun-Chhetri)
interests. Gellner suggested that one way to get
around this may be by changing the official outlook
on who is a dalit, who is a janjati and who is
Hindu and who is not, thus countervailing the
exclusionary tendency of the state.
Discussing notions of democracy, Gellner said
democracy in Nepal is variously known as prajatantra,
janatantra and janabad, which in themselves are
not clear definitions. Criticising the popular
definition, he said that the ‘government
of the people’ meant those who governed
in the name of the people were more equal than
the others, while ‘the people’ in
the formulation ‘of the people, for the
people, by the people’ remained undefined.
Did the term refer to men, or to adults, or to
men who are earning, or to all? Did democracy
refer to participation or representation, as in
the Rousseauvian model?
Gellner described various models and approaches
to democracy, including the Marxist and the liberal
models, and those posited by Schumpeter and Macpherson,
whose view predominates in American political
science. He said that there was a danger in the
increased acceptance globally of the value of
democracy without adequate analysis of the concept.
Its acceptance as an indicator of development,
such that ‘greater democracy’ of the
likes of grassroots empowerment has come to be
seen as a measure of greater development, is problematic.
Gellner proposed three conditions as necessary
for enabling democracy in Nepal, making a distinction
in the ones that were prescriptive in nature and
the one that is rooted in the factual circumstances
of the state today.
The most pressing need of the Nepali state today
is social order, without which there is a danger
of the ‘Biharisation’ of Nepal. The
restoration of social order means the restoration
of peace and the neutralising of armed groups.
The second need is of greater inclusion, measures
for which should be mandated by a revised constitution.
Third, he suggested a revision of the constitutional
enshrinement of Hinduism as the religion of official
patronage since the country is witnessing increased
ethnic politicisation, and is, in fact, to a large
degree, secular in practice. To implement this,
he suggested the inclusion of a comma in the constitution,
which would restrict the mandate of religion to
the king and not apply to the state.
Gellner suggested the restructuring of the federal
units of the country to make the districts larger
and so, fewer, and to effect greater decentralisation.
This would result in citizenship cards no longer
bearing the ethnic identity of the individual.
Suggesting the reconfiguration of constituencies
as multilingual and multicultural units, he proposed
reservations along the Indian model.
Addressing the issue of hybridity, Gellner stressed
the need to acknowledge hybridity in demographic
data-gathering and analyses. He suggested that
the modern state’s obsession with ethnic
and caste purity be abandoned in favour of encouraging
multi-ethnicity and celebrating a multiethnic
heritage. As a beginning, Gellner proposed that
people should be allowed to tick more than one
box in the religion and ethnicity categories in
the census form. In support of this, he cited
the case of the Newars, many of whom practise
a syncretic religion that tends towards Buddhism
but for reasons of state patronage tick Hinduism
in the census form, contributing to a skewed representation
of demographic data in official records. According
to Gellner, such an exercise will not only provide
a truer and more nuanced picture of Nepal’s
population, it will also force the state elites
to acknowledge their own hybridity and multi-ethnic
lineage. This might change the bahun-chhetri proclivity
for exclusivism, and thus, change the nature of
the Nepali state as well.
* * *
Bishnu Raj Upreti/Social exclusion and
the centralism as source of conflict in Nepal:
Ways forward for rebuilding trust
Centralism and social exclusion are fundamental
causes of the Maoist-state conflict, and a hurdle
to the building of trust, without which the conflict
cannot be settled. Several writers and thinkers
have interpreted the conflict as one of Maoist
violence, preferring not to see that the violence
is only an outer manifestation of many latent
conflicts. Since the status quo is under challenge,
conflict may be an opportunity for change and
accommodation, and if the Maoist case had been
addressed politically earlier, the situation would
not have become critical. Now that trust between
society and the state has been lost, Bishnu Upreti
recommended that conflict resolution be undertaken,
involving civil society in a significant way.
Social exclusion is a useful prism through which
to view the Maoist-state conflict. Fuelled by
a perception of injustice, the conflict has raged
through the country for several years. This injustice
that has caused such destruction to Nepal is built
into the centralist state’s structure. Even
under democracy, there has been no dramatic impetus
for inclusivity, and access to resources has remained
restricted by gender, caste, class, ethnicity
and religion.
Since the conflict has its roots in such grave
injustices, negotiations between the government
and the Maoists will not settle it, and the current
agenda for talks is merely procedural. It is important
to introduce elements of conflict transformation
into the process to ensure that the structure
is no longer inequitable. Upreti said conflict
resolution requires three complementary strategies:
transactional (negotiations), structural (reform
and capacity building) and transformational (confidence
building).
Upreti stressed on the building of civil society,
saying that since the conflict arose from issues
of exclusion, it was of absolute importance that
civil society actors be included in the resolution
of the conflict.
He also stressed the importance of confidence-building
measures, as a means of repairing the social fabric
of the country, especially in the conflict-affected
areas. It is important for politicians to deliver
on promises they make at the negotiating table.
Drawing on Robert Putnam’s definition of
the role of social capital, Upreti made a connection
from the formation of social capital, to the building
of trust and finally, the resolution of conflict.
At the community level, Upreti suggested transactional
mediation achieved through building local-level
civil society and commandeering media support.
He also suggested that reconciliation at the individual
level for those who have been direct victims of
the conflict process, whether internally displaced
persons or unemployed youth, must be facilitated.
He recommended the formation of community support
groups to address the needs of the thousands of
people who have been affected economically and
psychologically by the conflict, who he said were
falling through the cracks of the system even
though hostilities had ceased.
* * *
Questions and comments
Pettigrew’s and Gellner’s papers
prompted much debate. Harka Gurung felt that Pettigrew
had wrongly dramatised the work of the ACAP as
work among middle-aged and young women, since
ACAP primarily trained lahureni, women who have
been left behind by their migrant husbands, in
this case, mostly Maoists.
One participant laid the blame of gender exclusion
at the doorstep of the Local Administrations Act,
which is essentially a Hindu legislation. Pointing
out the semantics, he said that Nepal is not just
symbolically Hindu, but in practical terms too—in
the titles for official posts, etc—it is
hierarchically structured along Hindu values.
Comments were made about the exclusion of women
from the economic sphere, and how that has led
to the participation of women in the Maoist movement
in a quest to achieve the status of equal shareholders
in the country. It was also said that discrimination
against women in line with caste or ethnic hierarchies
is not exclusive to Gurung women in Nepal.
Responding to the queries, Pettigrew said that
the ACAP is a source of training and opportunity,
and the percentage of women that are involved
with the project has not been accurately captured
by official figures. She agreed that the economic
issue is vital to any discussion of women’s
involvement in decision-making, and said that
it is interesting that the state excludes women
in even the process of labelling these posts.
That said, however, the ethnic organisations are
not absolved of their failure to do enough. She
suggested that in the case of the Gurung women,
a combination of reservation, training and increased
opportunity would result in their greater inclusion.
S.D. Muni expressed uneasiness at David Gellner’s
recommendations. He questioned Gellner’s
use of the term ‘social order’ without
defining it, and therefore without defining what
should be preserved. Gellner’s approach
was also criticised for not allowing for incremental
action in redressing historical grievances. In
response, Gellner clarified that (social) order
is a supposition in the paper, and that he considered
ambitious propositions about changing society
and so on as academic hubris. Thus, his suggestion
simply was that the order be born out of the soil
and be flexible, since order imposed from the
top tends to crumble.
Gellner’s notion of hybridity and its linkage
with blood purity were seen as unconvincing; Muni
said that the question of ethnicity is not one
of blood purity but of imbalances and injustice.
Harka Gurung challenged Gellner’s hybridity
thesis, arguing that Chhetri names were basically
the watering down of Bahun names or the upgrading
of janjati names in a bid to legitimise offspring.
Nepali upper class ‘hybridity’ is
essentially not much more than a result of gender,
class and caste exploitation—of the kind
that was inherent in a Chhetri man having sexual
relations with a lower caste woman and never confirming
her status since such relationships were socially
unacceptable. The Chhetri hybrid population, it
was said, ‘is the patriarchal Hindu state
sleeping with janjati and dalit women’.
Defending his formulation, Gellner said that
his suggestion on hybridity was meant only as
a small beginning to acknowledge, in official
discourse, the fact that individuals may have
multiple ethnic ties. The tensions inherent in
identifying Buddhism with Hinduism in a state
that privileges Hindu citizens are enormous, as
there is a political agenda behind such identification.
Religious minorities still suffer under the historical
baggage of hearing that every Nepali is a Hindu.
The idea of pure mono-religious identity is a
Western import, and is at odds with the conditions
that exist locally.
Mahendra Lawoti cautioned against the blind
identity-based mobilisation, which has both positive
and negative consequences, recommending that ethnic
activists examine their role with care. He cited
the examples of identity-based movements from
Dutch and Swiss histories.
With regard to Upreti’s presentation,
the example of Bolivia was given, which despite
being an underdeveloped economy like Peru and
Nepal, does not have a guerrilla insurgency on
its hands because of devolution of power and equitable
resource allocation.
Upreti responded saying that the civil society
activism on the conflict has led to the search
for a ‘solution to the problem’. This
view does not recognise that Maoists are not a
problem but the logical outcome of historical
injustices manifested in a violent form. He stressed
again that it is important to remember civilians
who have been damaged by the war. They must be
rehabilitated, and there should be measures for
reconciliation at the community and individual
level if Nepal’s scars are to heal.
Friday, April 25
Morning, Shankar Hall
Session: Inclusion at the grassroots
Chair: Sharon Hepburn
Presenters: Bihari Krishna Shrestha
Sara Shneiderman
Genevieve Lakier
* * *
Bihari Krishna Shrestha/Democracy and
traditional social order in rural Nepal: The inclusionary
ferment of change at the grassroots
This presentation focused on democracy and the
traditional social order in rural Nepal. Social
exclusion in Nepal is the result of many factors:
resource deprivation, Hindu orthodoxy, political
deprivation, development deprivation, and geographical
isolation, among others. Poverty, in turn, is
typically linked to a matrix of attributes including
low caste/ethnic status, limited/non-existent
resource endowment, lack of land, illiteracy,
educational disadvantage, and lack of access to
institutions. In general, it can be characterised
as the existence of the poor as satellites to
elites.
The conflict-ridden social-political structure
is likewise defined by these characteristics,
in particular by the domination of Bahun, Chhetri
and Newar groups. More generally, party affiliation,
which forms the basis of the political structure,
is based on traditional rivalries among the elite.
Nepal’s politics suffers from a multiparty
paradox, a structurally defined distortion of
democracy. Even with changes in the party in power,
there has been a sustained failure to deliver
results to the people, leading to the present
Maoist conflagration. Some of the attributes of
this paradox are unethical behaviour on the part
of politicians, voting detached from ideology,
use of clan networks, and the buying of votes.
As a general rule, successful politicians are
corrupt.
One approach to overcoming the malaise of politics
is the devolution of power to local units. Community
forest programmes, which emerged after the desertification
alarm of the 1980s, are now common in parts of
Nepal. The Decentralisation Act of 1982 created
User Groups (UGs) of local people to manage resources,
and by 1988, with support from the World Bank,
UGs had spread to many parts of the country.
Forest User Groups (FUGs) are based on principles
of participatory decision-making, transparency
of management and accountability of leaders. Nepal
currently has 12,500 FUGs involving 1.3 million
households managing 933,000 hectares of forest.
Thanks to the programme, there are now more trees
being planted than cut down. FUGs operate through
the equitable distribution of forestry products,
and oftentimes low caste groups get greater shares.
In the Tarai, FUGs can include as many as 600
households, which is too large, although even
these groups are better than previous arrangements.
Another decentralisation effort is the Small
Farmer Cooperative Limited (SFCL), which was founded
in 1975. SFCLs facilitate grassroots saving projects
and credit groups of 5 to 9 members, usually women.
The project has suffered from politicisation,
overstaffing, high overhead costs and low recovery
rates, though it has contributed to ecological
maintenance and rural upliftment.
In the village of Naktajheej, about half of the
1100 households representing 25 caste groups (including
seven Dalit groups) participate in SFCLs. The
remaining households either do not participate
because they lack citizenship certificates or
because they have access to other finance institutions.
The SFCLs are good governance institutions because
their operation reflects VDC priorities.
There are some obstacles to the acceleration
of inclusion-based approaches at local levels.
Much talk of decentralisation on the part of officials
and ‘distinctive’ donor agencies is
mere rhetoric, and the government is often unresponsive.
Donors could be more helpful, and researchers
could take greater interest in these programmes.
This investigation into democracy and local-level
programmes leads to a number of related conclusions.
First, exclusion is historically derived and remains
largely unchallenged. Second, democracy must be
custom tailored to the needs and limitations of
communities. Third, Nepal has not yet completely
engaged with democracy. Four, the extensive devolution
of authority to local groups should be a future
priority. Finally, civil society must play a strong
role in monitoring this process and helping it
advance.
* * *
Sara Shneiderman/The Formation of Political
Consciousness in Rural Nepal: Lessons from Local
History
The Maoist insurgency has served as a wake-up
call for social scientists in Nepal, in that new
actors – rural, non-elite Nepalis –
are playing an important role in the country’s
politics. For a mode of politics to be truly progressive,
it must engage local issues, including the diverse
discourses that feed left-wing or religious-based
movements. Nepali politics has largely failed
in this task to date, and if the state wishes
to avoid future insurgencies, it must find a way
to bring political consciousness productively
into the national discourse.
One entry point for examination of the Maoist
movement is considering why Maoist ideology has
proven so ‘successful’. More broadly,
the Nepali state might benefit by looking at how
this movement has grown, and why people respond
to it. In considering the Maoist movement, most
academics have viewed the insurgency as an aberration
or as a continuation of political party splits.
This presentation takes a different angle, placing
the Maoist movement within Nepal’s longer
history of violence.
The work of Antonio Gramsci posits three conditions
for a crisis of hegemony: crisis at the top, a
serious economic situation, and a crisis at the
base. This paper argues that Nepal faces a Gramscian
crisis of hegemony, and emphasises the third condition
of developments at the ‘base’ level.
There are structural similarities between the
pre-independence peasant movements in India studied
by Ranajit Guha and the current situation in Nepal.
Political consciousness, as argued by Guha, always
exists with peasants, and ‘apolitical’
people are not tricked into movements. In the
case of Nepal, interviews with ex-fighters and
Maoist sympathisers appear also to confirm this.
A local event may prove critical to the development
of ideologies and identities. In 1984, in Piskar,
Sindhupalchowk, police killed seven villagers
during a festival. In interviews, all ex-Maoist
fighters from Sindhupalchowk cited the seven deaths
as a grievance against the government. Operations
Romeo (1995) and Kilo Sierra (1998), during which
the Nepali state attempted to pacify the region,
also contributed to the receptivity of anti-government
messages, though grievances dated back much further.
What happened at Piskar is important for understanding
the Maoist movement’s later success in the
area. During the festival, about 2000 villagers
gathered for a local jatra at which landlords
were customarily mocked. In 1984, the police,
at the behest of a powerful landlord, fired on
the crowd, killing seven and seriously injuring
15. A petition concerning the incident was filed
with government of Lokendra Bahadur Chand, but
nothing came of it.
Amnesty International and INSEC reports suggest
that outside political agitators might have imbued
the 1984 jatra with politics. However, others
say that political consciousness had been growing
in the area in its own right. Either way, the
structural shape of jatra participation foreshadowed
local Thangmi villagers participation in the Maoist
movement. When the Maoists showed up in early
1998, many of their demands matched with expressions
first voiced during and after the jatra. As the
movement grew, the Maoists and the government
began competing for hegemony.
In Thangmi discourse, the first two Thangmi
dead were initially seen as martyrs for democracy.
But, later, after the perception of democracy
as having failed had settled in, these deaths
were interpreted in other ways. Many people were
affected by the killings and the round of arrests
following the jatra, with some imprisoned for
as long as three years. The killings were eventually
interpreted as a basis for anti-state feelings.
The practical ideology of the Maoist movement
in Dolakha, as opposed to the theoretical ideology
of the larger movement, reflected people’s
concrete needs. Locals agreed with the tailored
demands of the Maoists, though most perhaps did
not really understand the theoretical ideology.
But practical ideology alone cannot provide a
basis for egalitarian civil society, and, as shown
in James Scott’s formulation, revolutionaries
often do not eliminate hegemonies. This would
appear to hold true for Nepal, where the Maoists
are more hegemonic than the state in many respects.
Local politics can be harnessed for different
purposes. But why did Maoism strike a chord with
the population when other ideologies did not?
Another issue is the tendency to view these groups
as regional ethnic actors as opposed to national
political ones. The Maoists have succeeded to
a certain extent in co-opting ‘ethnic’
grievances into their political programme, in
large part taking over the Janjati agenda. More
generally, there is a need to move beyond ethnic
and development ideologies that limit the impact
of local actors.
* * *
Genevieve Lakier/Public spectacle and
political power: The bandh and democracy in Nepal
This paper is concerned with bandhs and democracy
in Nepal, and is the beginning of a dissertation.
Primarily it focuses on what happens when local
actors come to Kathmandu to protest the state.
Rather than focus on what did not happen during
that last 13 years, an examination is made into
what did happen. Symbolic public protests became
quite common, and the adoption of varied protest
forms by opposition groups indicates the exercise
of political freedom. Despite the autocratic leanings
of the present dispensation, the king cannot stop
such activities. In fact, visible repression by
the state only makes these popular movements stronger.
The bandh, in part because of its stubbornness,
has grown to be an important element in the operation
of democracy in Nepal. Populist rhetoric calls
on the state to live up to its populist commitments.
Popular protest challenges the state to its right
of control, often through self-inflicted pain,
such as hunger strikes. While against the state
at some level, nationalism is very strong in public
rhetoric, perhaps owing to the existence of large
neighbouring countries.
An examination of Nepali democracy should centre
on events in the country, not merely dismiss aspects
of the situation as deficient in comparison to
other countries. In 1991, German researchers found
that Nepalis’ expectations of ‘democracy’
did not match with their own assumptions. Nepalis
indicated a willingness to become personally involved
in politics, in contrast to actors in many other
democracies. Villagers and the poor were the most
willing to be active. These groups were very well
versed in national issues, which caught Western
scholars by surprise.
Protest is a kind of public discourse, and it
forces the government to listen in what is otherwise
a power-dominant relationship. What distinguishes
these movements as spectacles is that they are
public events; a hunger strike in secret would
not have much effect. Indeed, how much of a public
spectacle something is may be more important than
the ideology behind it.
The free press has played an important role
in promoting these protests. Some journalists
have noted that the Maoists are able to pull off
bandhs because of the publicity afforded them
by the press. Censorship cannot prevent bandhs,
and eventually they always become front-page news.
It is important to note that while other forms
of consumption are disrupted by bandhs, papers
continue to reach their audiences. As such, any
discussion of democracy in Nepal has to take into
consideration the role of the press.
Spectacles involve both supporters and non-supporters,
and they disrupt the economy, including tourism.
Moreover, by calling on the state to solve problems,
the rhetoric of protests reinforces the role of
the state as the agent of change. But this is
paradoxical, as bandhs weaken the ability of the
state to meet protestors’ demands.
Nepal has developed a strong form of public
dissent because the state has shown itself to
be immune to most other forms of dissent. At the
national level, the organisations capable of pulling
off bandhs often increase their own institutional
power. Protest can be productive even in its failure
through the politicisation of ordinary citizens.
Even if this is bad in some respects, it expands
democracy.
Third world democracy is characterised by citizen
action much more so than in the West. The state’s
unwillingness or inability to suppress dissent
means that critics capture the public space. Participation
in protest often extends beyond traditional Bahun-Chhetri
domination of politics, and young and rural voices
have a role in protest politics in Kathmandu.
Nepali politics, as seen in these protests, is
more complicated than simplistic analysis of domination
of the public sphere by certain political actors.
* * *
Questions and comments
The presentations of Bihari Shrestha and Sara
Shneiderman generated a great deal of discussion.
Panellists and audience members primarily asked
Shrestha about the design and implementation of
development projects. Lynn Bennett pointed out
that David Gellner’s new book includes accounts
of corruption among VDC officials, prompting her
to ask Shrestha how the integrity of local-level
governance can be improved. A member of the audience
pointed out that while the World Bank may have
contributed to Nepal’s development through
UGs, many of the Bank’s practices, in particular
secret voting that makes accountability impossible,
are undemocratic and often harmful. Another question
addressed the challenge of translating good local-level
programmes into national policies, while Seira
Tamang called on Shrestha to analyse the role
of civil society and the avenues for holding officials
accountable.
Shrestha responded by arguing that, whatever
their shortcomings, local-level groups are more
accountable today than they were five years ago.
He acknowledged that many actions of the World
Bank were questionable, but that of all its interventions
in Nepal, the UGs were the most successful. Shrestha
also argued that all sections of the populace
can improve their standing through development
efforts, but that for certain disadvantaged groups
this process takes longer. On the question of
accountability, Shrestha argued for closer cooperation
between officials and researchers, which would
help produce locally tailored policies. Finally,
in response to the civil society question, he
drew a distinction between groups that are stamp-issuing
versus those that mobilise people. He argued that
the second kind held great potential for helping
Nepal.
The questions and comments to Shneiderman focused
on both the events in Sindhupalchowk described
in her presentations and the paper’s theoretical
underpinnings. John Whelpton asked what other
events might have contributed to the formation
of Thangmi political identity and discussed conflicting
reports that he had read about the ethnic composition
of the 1984 jatra. On the theoretical aspects,
an audience member praised Shneiderman for her
emphasis on villager agency and drew a comparison
between the Maoist and Hindutva movements, arguing
that both were misunderstood by those who fail
to consider why individual actors make the decisions
that they do. Finally, Shneiderman was asked if
it was possible to avoid the replication of hegemony
at the local level and what the role of village
ethnography should be when examining politics.
Shneiderman answered the questions in turn,
first stating that while there may have been some
pre-1984 protests in Sindhupalchowk, the critical
event appears to have been the 1984 jatra. She
also discounted the reports cited by Whelpton
about Tamang participation in the jatra, stating
that the ethnic mix was predominantly Thangmi.
In response to the comment about agency, Shneiderman
offered her agreement and stated that it was also
important to consider the politics of non-alignment,
why some people do not join a movement. Finally,
she argued that village-level ethnography is extremely
important when trying to understand politics,
but that ethnographies suffer from a time-lag
problem and that any attempt to analyse politics
locally must take into consideration corresponding
national events.
The questions for Lakier centred on the economics
of the bandh, and what measures could be taken
to prevent its usage. Lakier responded that while
a bandh may be generally harmful in economic terms,
it appears that it is impossible to ban it and,
as such, it is more useful to consider its beneficiaries
and losers and what needs and functions its fulfils.
Elites in cities tend to be aloof from mass politics,
and the bandh is an avenue through which citizens
outside of the power structure can influence events.
Economically, one group that appears to benefit
from bandhs is the media, the distribution mechanisms
of which are generally unaffected by strikes.
Friday, April 25
Afternoon, Gauri Hall
Sesssion: Structures and visions II
Chair: S.D. Muni
Presenters: Krishna Bhattachan
Krishna Hachhethu
Krishna Khanal
* * *
Krishna Bhattachan/Expected model and
process of inclusive democracy in Nepal
Krishna Bhattachan presented a model of inclusive
democracy in Nepal and the expected process leading
up to it. Studying the historical processes that
have led to the present make up of the Nepali
state, which is seen as exclusionary by a vast
number of people, Bhattachan argued that if bahunbaad,
the dominance of Bahun-Chhetris in every aspect
of political, economic and social life, is not
rectified, Nepal will have to deal with multiple
insurgencies. The model that Bhattachan proposed
addresses the exclusionary character of the Nepali
state, with a view to making it inclusionary.
It was built from various reports of the expectations
of leaders, activists and scholars from the marginalised
peoples and the mainstream as reported in the
media. The experiences of other countries were
also a resource to draw on while building the
model.
Identifying bahunbaad as the major ideological
fault line, in the past and in the present, Bhattachan
described the many ways in which Bahun-Chhetris
from the midhills of Nepal have exercised their
domination in shaping Nepal. He also criticised
the group for its hypocrisy, further undermining
its legitimacy to control affairs of the state.
Giving the example of liquor consumption which
has come to be associated in a denigrative sense
with the lower castes and ethnic groups because
of public condemnation by Bahuns, Bhattachan said
that bahuns themselves consume it in copious quantities
in private. During the Panchayat era, the main
playing fields of bahunbaad were the sites of
the marginalised (such as liquor). Because of
bahunbaad, the politics of a ‘rainbow culture’
were never allowed to take off in Nepal, which
is multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual and
multi-religious. This is because Bahun and Chhetri
men monopolised power and knowledge at the expense
of dalits, non-Hindus, madhesis and women, and
developed entrenched interests in the perpetuation
of their dominance.
Bhattachan’s model described eight elements,
four structural and four procedural. The, model,
he stressed, must be taken as an organic whole,
to be implemented in its entirety. He proposed
a federal state, with the federal units configured
through a multi-pronged approach, using distinctions
of hill and mountain, or tarai and madhes, and
region in different parts of the country.
He contested that the exercise of grassroots democracy,
the right to self-determination and affirmative
action (remedial and preferential), accompanied
by proportional representation and federalism
would lead to the disintegration of the country,
as is alleged by Bahuns. He dismissed as baseless
fears, for example, that the madhes would merge
with India if devolution was effected, stressing
on the economic unviability of such a move for
the people of madhes, and the strong Nepali identity
among the madhesis. Contesting bahunbaad and its
assertion that changing the political structures
of the country would lead to the collapse of Nepal,
Bhattachan argued that a model of federalism was
needed to avert precisely that. Inclusive democracy
was the only way Nepal could steer away from repeated
conflicts.
* * *
Krishna Hachhethu/The question of inclusion
and exclusion in Nepal: Interface between state
and ethnicity
The discourse on ethnicity in Nepal has developed
with conflicting views – pre-modernist versus
instrumentalist – on the conceptual framework.
This division among scholars refers to the problem
of inclusion along the lines of majority/minority
or Bahun-Chhetri, i.e. in terms of dominant group/subjugated
group. This debate comes up in relation with matters
of politics, polity and state. Addressing the
issue of inclusion through an examination of the
interface between the state and ethnicity, Krishna
Hachhetu analysed historical inter-group relations
to see what spaces exist for inclusive democracy
in Nepal, and investigated the chances of democratic
consolidation. In present times, when Nepal is
looking at caste relations, it is important to
recall whether these were harmonious or historically
conflict-ridden, even if latently so. Noting that
national integration itself was an imposition
from the top, Hachhethu said that since the history
of a nation is non-democratic, the nation-state
was by definition exclusionary.
In Nepal, after 1990, ethnic activism increased.
The domains of identity, resources and participation
were the principal sites of struggle. But, while
appreciating the importance of ethnic movements,
he warned that these could easily degenerate into
a communal struggle depending on what/who was
the target of academic criticism.
Hachhetu briefly discussed the evolution of
Nepal’s constitution, describing each of
Nepal’s four constitutions between 1950
and the present. The success of the 1990 movement
and post-1990 activism, he said, could be seen
in the greater respect for identity as manifest
in the inclusion of the category of caste in the
census, and some legislation. Enumerating the
achievements of janjati activism, Hachhetu said
they were a) the breaking of old symbols of nationalism
and the building of more accurately representative
ones in a move towards multi-culturalism; b) the
tension, precipitated by the Maoist conflict,
between the monarchy and new emerging nationalisms;
c) the progress from a majoritarian democracy
to a consensual system, and the realisation that
a better system should be in place that will promote
decentralisation; and, d) the impact of pressure
groups, which will eventually lead to the restructuring
of the state.
* * *
Krishna Khanal/Ethnicity, exclusion
and autonomy: Remaking of the constitution
Proposing a revision of the constitution, Krishna
Khanal said that the tensions in the state, inherent
in the 1990 constitution, have led to conflict.
In the context of government negotiations with
the Maoists, the constitution would have to undergo
revision either in the form of new constitution
or through amendments.
Khanal said that the contradictions of abiding
by the principle of the right to self-determination,
and managing them within a given state structure
were beginning to show in Nepal, which as a country
of immense ethnic and linguistic variety, is faced
with a unique challenge. Bahun-Chhetri domination
has de-legitimised the ‘integration’
of Nepal for many ethnic groups. The military
structure alone was and is not adequate for managing
the contradictions of the state that arise from
this situation. Now, making the state a federation
and deciding the basis on which units are to be
created will be a challenge but it is a challenge
that must be taken up.
In making a new constitution, Khanal suggested
that the following be considered: a) the removal
of the clause that makes Nepal a Hindu state;
b) making provisions for the just representation
of all communities; c) the principle of proportional
representation as a mechanism for power sharing;
d) a three-tier government and the devolution
of power; and e) federalism with autonomous units.
At present, only a few political parties accept
this agenda, and even they have not carefully
considered the basis of how these changes may
be brought. Khanal said that federalism, regional
structure and decentralized district are being
floated in the context of restructuring the state.
Ethnic activists, Maoists and some small political
parties are advocating federalism, while such
large parties like the Nepali congress and the
Communist Party of Nepal (UML), are insisting
on decentralized local government with some form
of regional structures. Referring to Govind Neupane,
who is close to the Maoist and has laboured much
to carve out ethno-regional based units of federation
of Nepal, Mr. Khanal questioned that how the proposed
provinces will accommodate diverse ethnic groups
when it requires compromises between, for example,
the Rai and Limbu, and the Gurung and Magar communities
in the same provinces. He said, there are many
models of federalism that may be followed or borrowed
with suitable adaptation to Nepali context. The
structure may be decided on the basis of populations
(i.e. ethnic groups) or on the basis of region.
He said that a detailed study of territoriality
and ethnicity would have to be available in order
to provide a shape of federalism in Nepal’s
context.
* * *
Questions and comments
Much of the discussion revolved around the precise
ways in which federalism could be implemented,
and the character of the Nepali state. S.D. Muni
suggested that the problem is not with the interface
of ethnicity and the state, but with the state
assuming an ethnic character. The conceptualisation
of ethnic diversity as inherently conflictual
is too convenient. That certain factors have turned
coexistential ethnicity to conflictual ethnicity
needs to be recognised, and these need to be identified.
Muni also said that there are limits to self-determination.
Pointing out that Nepal is not uniquely multiethnic,
he suggested that for states such as Nepal, state-nation
is a more appropriate formulation than nation-state.
Questioning the appropriateness of emulating
the Swiss example, as had been recommended time
and again by presenters, one observer said, in
1950, Switzerland and Nepal both had populations
of 5.6 million; today the Swiss population is
still a little above 7 million, but Nepal’s
population has grown almost five-fold to 25 million,
and that while for the moment Nepal has a carrying
capacity vis-à-vis population growth, it
may soon become uncontrollable.
Challenging Krishna Khanal’s view that
federalism will not lead to disintegration, it
was said that while thinking about giving groups
the right to self-determination, one must be prepared
for the eventuality that some groups may chose
not to remain with the central state. Posing a
question to Khanal, the speaker asked what hope
there was for the federal model when the two largest
parties in the country, the Nepali Congress and
the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)
had both discounted the proposal. Khanal responded
that there was some change in attitude as these
two parties did seem to be considering federalism,
and were allowing an intra-party discussion on
the subject.
There was a suggestion that the problems encountered
by India in its experience of federalism, where
units have been configured on the basis of language,
must be studied in Nepal. And that while considering
federalism, it is important to keep in mind long-term
consequences, such as the impact on urbanisation
and of internal migration.
It was proposed that considerations of urban/rural
be factored into deliberations on federalism,
and a return to territorialities of the period
prior to the unification. The current mix of populations
is largely a Kathmandu phenomenon. In line with
this, Saubhagya Shah suggested that Nepal could
consider the kind of federal relationship that
existed between the baisey and chaubisey units
in pre-unification Nepal.
While Nepal seems ready for new political structures
the relations of dominance continue as a holdover
from previous periods. Questions were raised about
the consequences for Bahun-Chhetri groups, who
currently dominate administration and governance?
It was felt that to cater to the demands that
had come up in the post-1990 activism, a new system
must be evolved. While there are no ultimate answers,
the system, which provides the framework within
which solutions may be found, should be resilient;
it is important to build resilience into the system.
Those in power will have to face pressure from
below, for power is rarely relinquished willingly.
There needs to be a genuine intellectual exercise
of national relevance when seeking to build the
structure of Nepali federalism.
Some participants contested the ethnographic
preponderance of the discussion, and said that
economic and geographical factors had been ignored
in the presentations. One observer drew attention
to the fact that the presenters had ignored the
unresolved problem of citizenship in the tarai.
With an upsurge of information and awareness,
there are greater demands on the state.
Responding to the queries directed at him, Khanal
said that for more than two decades, the lens
of caste and ethnicity has replaced the lens of
class. He said that the redrawing of administrative
units does not necessitate going back to pre-unification
times. Shifting to a federal structure is not
a question of reviving old structures but of constructing
new ones that are sensitive to ethnic delineations.
The Bahuns and Chhetris will not be wiped out
in an equitable system, but will also be included;
federalism will, however, redefine traditional
relationships. Answering those who had raised
doubts about federalism, Khanal said those who
are suspicious that federalism will be disintegrative
for Nepal and will not consider economic realities
ignore the fact that central control of resources
can be done away with under federalism. At the
same time, while considering questions of economy,
people must remember that so far whatever economic
zoning is in place has not worked.
Friday, April 25
Afternoon, Shankar Hall
Session: Politics of language
Chair: Santa Bahadur Pun
Presenters: Pratyoush Onta
Mark Turin
Rhoderick Chalmers
* * *
Pratyoush Onta/Radio and the politics
of democratic culture in Nepal
This paper focuses on Radio Nepal, in particular
its early period in the 1960s when the Panchayat
system was being established. At that time, the
new political system needed philosophical justification,
which state radio aspired to provide in part.
In weighing this period of Nepal’s history,
this presentation is mostly suggestive and general,
and many details have been left out.
The history of radio programming in Nepal is
only a half-century old. Radio arrived in 1951
with the arrival of democracy, but in the first
decade it did not seem to play much of a role.
For example, the Nepali Congress did not issue
radio proclamations. But after King Mahendra’s
December 1960 coup, radio became a tool to reinforce
the ideological-cultural-political matrix.
Of all mediums, radio was the farthest reaching.
By and large, radio programmes featured development
themes, the promotion of bikas. After 1965, only
Nepali language programming was aired in most
categories, helping to establish Nepali as a national
language.
In the six months after the 1960 coup, Radio
Nepal spent much effort trying to justify the
dismissal of multi-party democracy. In following
years, culture became an important theme of radio
programming, often as a guise for justifying the
existing political-social structure. Explicitly
political programming concentrated on Panchayat
philosophy after the Panchayat constitution was
promulgated, and more generally, radio became
a tool for promoting kingship.
Concerning development, in 1960-62 Radio Nepal
devoted significant attention to the east-west
highway, often implying that the road was a result
of the king’s efforts. The distinction between
justifying the Panchayat system and justifying
bikas is difficult to make, as the two agendas
intersected: good citizens were ones who supported
the king and worked for the advancement of the
nation.
Critics often say that Radio Nepal was a tool
of the regime, but that is not the whole story.
While development imperatives were used to justify
the political situation, international compulsions
and theories of nation building must also be considered.
UNESCO, for instance, estimated in the 1960s that
70 per cent of the world’s people lacked
access to information sources. Governments were
invited to create state-supported media outlets,
and many academics and consultants touted radio
as a tool of economic development and even nation
building. However, internationally famous texts
about radio and media development had nothing
to do with democracy; in fact, they were implicitly
statist. The promotion of radio was more closely
linked to development – and expectations
of social change – than with democracy.
By 1969, these general assumptions had made
their way into a UNESCO report on radio in Nepal.
The report argued that the public likes radio,
as is clear from the popularity of community listening
centres, and consequently, state-backed radio
programmes on development could advance bikas.
Consultants in these years also supported the
use of Nepali as an exclusive language of education
on the ground that it would help build the nation-state.
While it is relatively easy for a developed
country to have a free press, developing countries
generally have a more difficult time. And, indeed,
some international consultants supported the Panchayat
radio system, even as it was used against multi-party
democracy. In contemporary Nepal, the legacy of
these years is that Radio Nepal continues to be
the country’s dominant medium, and reform
efforts continue to be resisted.
* * *
Mark Turin/The many tongues of the nation:
Ethnolinguistic politics in post-1990 Nepal
The aim of this paper is to move beyond the
rhetoric of ‘Nepal is a poor, landlocked
state’ and to penetrate more deeply the
diversity of this society. Nepal is a richly multi-lingual
country, although the constitution fails to note
this.
In categorising Nepal’s language groups,
it is common to refer to ‘Tibeto-Burman
speakers’, although there is no such language
as Tibeto-Burman. As a category, Tibeto-Burman
implies a false sense of cohesion. In reality,
speakers of the same language family may not get
along, such as the Germans and the English. But,
in Nepal, the ‘Tibeto-Burman’ category
is a cover for many other assumptions about the
people grouped into this language family. This
classification places the location of these languages
not in Nepal, but in Tibet and Burma, which suggests
that the speakers of these languages are not genuinely
of Nepal. A better term might be ‘Tibeto-Nepali’.
Nepali scholarship needs to take on this question.
There is much stereotyping of Tibeto-Burman people,
from Prachanda to Westerners, oftentimes in the
vein that they are fierce fighters and have Chinese
features.
Indigenous communities are where different theories
collide. Ethnic classifications may differ from
self-descriptions, and rare is the language that
is known by only one name. It is customary to
name a group by the language that it speaks, and
the name given by a group to itself is often not
the same one imposed by outsiders. For instance,
consider Newar and Newari, the second being influenced
by Indo-Arayan conventions.
This also plays out in the various names of
the 30,000-40,000-strong Thami/Thangmi/Thani people.
The first of these names is a national description,
the second is a self-name, and the third is a
religious name. Each of these designations involves
a different origin story and represents an attempt
by someone at naming a group of people. The word
‘Thami’, for instance, comes from
an unflattering Brahminical myth about these people’s
origins.
Some political theorists argue that groups such
as the Thangmi represent a fourth world: those
marginalised in the third world. According to
census data, of Nepal’s 75 districts, 74
have Thamgmi residents, although most Thangmi-speakers
are concentrated in two economically marginalised
northern districts. And while such ethnic surveys
are important, their data are rarely analysed
in full and put to good use. Moreover, the biases
of census-takers, who are often city-dwelling
upper-caste Hindus, are evident.
There is also a political aspect to group identification.
Some ethno-activists want to maximise their group’s
strength by ‘aligning’ with other
non-Hindu groups to claim a larger portion of
state resources. Others want to stress their group’s
individuality by using clan names that distinguish
them from neighbouring peoples. In the 2001 census,
this dual process played out, and with census
data showing more than 1200 languages (of which
just over 100 were eventually recognised by the
state) and 533 ethnic groups (of which 61 received
official recognition).
A commonly voiced concern is that many unique
languages are dying out, although the rhetoric
of this argument is fatalistic. In Nepal, in what
is a metaphor of sorts, Tribuvan University’s
language journal adopted as its title ‘Gipan’,
a word that means language in an already dead
language. The good news is that the central government
plans to fully document the languages of the kingdom
and produce an encyclopaedia on the languages
of Nepal.
The Thangmi language, while still spoken by
some people, is suffering from the increasing
encroachment of Nepali, which has a wider vocabulary.
Even so, Thangmi is proving to be versatile, with
new words being coined and new songs being composed.
Some Thangmi ethnic-activists are even trying
to ‘discover’ a unique Thangmi script,
as the constitution appears to offer official
recognition to languages with a literate tradition.
* * *
Rhoderick Chalmers/The language of Pushkin
and the language of pundits: Perspectives on Sanskritisation,
Nepali, and political participation
The usage of different languages in Nepal reflects
different perspectives and assumptions. Consider,
for example, Mayos, the brand of instant noodles.
‘Mayos’ refers both to English, ‘my
own’, and to Nepali, ‘maya’.
But the use of English and Nepali in the packaging
is strikingly different. The nutritional information,
which reveals how unhealthy the product is, is
written in English; the Nepali consumer is not
meant to understand it. The prize coupon, usually
awarding another package of the product, is written
in Nepali.
This presentation will skim over parts of the
paper and focus on politics and language. There
is one theory that all people have a right to
engage in politics in their own language. But,
in practice, this does not always happen, such
as this conference on Nepali democracy, which
is being conducted in English.
Comparative frameworks help explain Nepal’s
present situation. In the late 18th and early
19th centuries in Russia, Pushkin was the ‘first
poet’. Both Pushkin and his later counterparts
in other languages produced a polished, ‘sophisticated’
style of language that was subsequently adopted
as the national standard. That is to say, it is
natural for languages to undergo a period of change
and transformation.
It is also relevant to consider the role of
irony in language. One common complaint, particularly
from janjatis, is that Nepali is too heavily Sanskritised.
But when janjatis voice their criticism of Brahmin-Nepali
language domination, they often use the linguistic
tools of Sanskrit. Moreover, the word for ‘irony’
in Nepali comes from a Sanskrit word that does
not have the same meaning as its Nepali usage.
The association of the word with irony comes from
the influence of English.
In Russia, the influence of French had to be
purged to construct a modern Russian language.
Over time, Russians replaced much of the huge
lexicon of English and French with Slavic terms.
In contemporary Nepali, there is a similar challenge,
although instead of adapting from Sanskrit, the
task is adapting from English. It terms of range,
Nepali is a relatively small language, and it
has to expand to keep up with English. There is
a latent assumption on the part of some that Nepali
does not have the right to an expansive modern
vocabulary. But, over the course of the last century,
in part because of the influence of India, Nepali
has demonstrated its ability to grow as a language
to accommodate non-traditional expressions. This
is an important process for helping new ideas
to develop.
Different languages also have different associations.
English is assumed to be a modern, intellectual
language. But English language products do not,
for the most part, figure in Nepal’s local
intellectual life. Not a single academic work
has ever been translated into Nepali, despite
the obvious utility of much of the English language
research for non-English-speaking Nepalis. So,
there is a sharp divide in Nepal between those
who have access to English, and those who do not.
Janjati activists and Maoists alike have attacked
the domination of Sanskrit languages. In part
this comes as a reaction to unnecessary state
promotion of Sanskrit, such as the Nepali Congress’s
efforts promote it while in power, which essentially
served as a Brahmin jobs programme and an effort
to establish cultural dominance.
The language-ethnic identities parallel, such
as Newar-speakers being Newars, does not hold
absolutely. In the context of anti-Sanskrit demonstrations,
which are carried out by people speaking non-Sanskrit
languages, those who would most benefit from reading
the books that are being burnt are the very activists
burning them. Politics today is a matter of political
language, of engaging in the dominant discourse.
Consider how left-wing politics is intensely about
literal interpretation. Many Brahmins lead leftist
movements because rhetoric requires a firm understanding
of the terms being used in political discourse,
and Brahmins are often in the best situation to
do that.
Conversely, while many janjatis denounce Nepali
as ‘not theirs’, some Brahmins claim
Nepali in an exclusionary manner: ‘Yes,
it is of the Brahmins, Nepali does not belong
to the janjatis’. Many Brahmins do not want
others to succeed in Nepal, because they recognise
that mastery of language is power. This holds
true in the academic world also, where many foreign
researchers writing in English bandy about Nepali
words that they have little understanding of.
For political purposes, Nepali can be the only
language of meaningful discourse. What Himal Khabarpatrika
publishes is infinitely better than what comes
out in Nepali Times. But donors, the people who
could facilitate the expansion of the Nepali language,
do not understand this fact, and do not support
projects like Nepali font standardisation which
would have a huge impact on language in Nepal.
* * *
Questions and comments
Questions and comments addressed to Pratyoush
Onta concerned the scope of media transmission
in Nepal in the 1960s and the ongoing tension
between democracy and development. On the first
issue, a panellist pointed out that media, both
print and broadcast, suffered from many technical
limitations in the period examined by Onta, and
to a lesser extent event today. He also argued
that the effectiveness of state messages in the
1960s was undermined by the linguistic diversity
of the country; many people simply would not have
understood the messages of bikas. Another respondent
stated that he had heard of a new World Bank memo
which argues that the October 2002 dismissal of
democracy by the king ushered in bright time for
development in Nepal as politics would not interfere
with donor efforts as much.
Onta responded to the first question but not
to the comment about the purported World Bank
memo. He acknowledged the problem of transmission
and comprehension, and stated that it is difficult
to know with precision what the range of state
media was in earlier decades. As for the limited
comprehension because of language differences,
Onta averred that programme repetitiveness and
some translating would have made it somewhat accessible
to Nepal’s non-Nepali speaking population.
Questions for Mark Turin primarily pertained
to his comments about the Tibeto-Burman language
category and the implications of his argument
for democracy. One panellist discussed the Newar
language, which is Tibeto-Burman but heavily influenced
by Indo-Aryan, to suggest that categories need
flexibility. Two respondents questioned the harms
Turin identified of using the Tibeto-Burman category,
and questions were also raised about desirability
or otherwise of Thangmi speakers adopting Nepali
words into their lexicon and the reliability of
the Prachanda quote cited by Turin as evidence
of stereotyping about speakers of the language
family. Finally, one audience member asked about
the impact of ethno-linguistic assertion on the
practice of democracy in Nepal.
Turin started by noting that Newar does have
a core Tibeto-Burman vocabulary, but that he did
not intend through his presentation to argue that
language categories are necessarily rigid. As
for the significance of the Tibeto-Burman category
itself, he argued that its importance lies in
its implications. Because labels are debated and
discussed, the terms applied to language families
are significant. In response to the point about
Thangmi speakers’ adoption of Nepali words,
he argued that this phenomenon is not surprising
given the reach of Nepali, but that some of these
‘imported’ words never gain wide usage.
Concerning the reliability of the Prachanda quote,
he argued that the publication in which it appeared
could probably be considered a reliable source.
Lastly, the participation of small ethno-linguistic
groups in democracy is possible, Turin argued,
though he acknowledged that it is difficult to
find the right balance. But all people want to
belong to a nation. The challenge is in creating
meaningful categories within that nation for people
to play a part through.
Respondents to Rhoderick Chalmers’s presentation
on language and political participation drew attention
to comparative examples, the varying commercial
and political usages of English and Nepali, Chalmers’s
employment of terms and the practical problems
of expanding the Nepali vocabulary. One panellist
compared the challenge faced by Nepali speakers
today to the efforts of Bangla speakers in the
early 20th century to create a modern vocabulary.
He also asked why it was that few, if any, academic
works were translated into Nepali. Another respondent
raised a point about the usage of English in the
business sphere in Nepal and the usage of Nepali
in politics, querying what the relationship between
the two was. Neera Chandhoke asked Chalmers to
expand on his concept of language, suggesting
that his formulation was too narrow to take into
account real-life usage. Likewise, a point about
disciplinary boundaries was raised in response
to an introductory comment by Chalmers that he
is not a social scientist on the ground that much
of his research appears to be social scientific.
Finally, an audience member raised a practical
question about the ability of Nepali to coin new
words without an English context. For example,
Himal Khabarpatrika often prints parenthetical
explanations of Nepali words that are better known
by their English names. Is there a way to avoid
this, and is it an any case undesirable?
Chalmers responded to the comparison of Nepal
and Bengal by stating that, while there are no
thorough studies of the process of Sanskritisation
in the Nepali press, some Russian scholars, perhaps
because of the history of their native language,
have examined the topic more generally in South
Asia. But it is interesting to note that ‘Sanskritised’
words are often actually mistranslations from
Sanskrit. Concerning this process as it applies
to the usage of English explanations in publications
like Himal Khabarpatrika, sometimes a new Nepali
term will develop in its own right in place of
the English word, as is the case already with
‘middle class’ and ‘proletariat’,
but in other cases Nepali speakers will simply
incorporate the English word into their lexicon.
This is partially an outcome of the fact that
many English terms have very awkward equivalents
in Sanskirt, if at all.
As for the differing uses of English and Nepal,
each group of language speakers is geared toward
a target audience. Politicians are generally loquacious
in Nepali because this is a job requirement for
mass politics. English is confined to a different,
smaller space. (Chalmers added that, incidentally,
it was sad to note that no Nepali politicians
had been invited to this conference on democracy
in Nepal.) Finally, Chalmers conceded that he
could consider his limited usage of the term language.
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
