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Summary of paper presentations made
at the conference
The Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali
Democracy
organised by
Social Science Baha
24-26 April, 2003
Saturday, April 27
Morning, Gauri Hall
Session: Structures and visions III
Chair: AC Sinha
Presenters: Bharat Raj Upreti
Michael Hutt
* * *
Bharat Raj Upreti/Constitution
and electoral reform
According to Bharat Raj Upreti, the 1990 constitution
of Nepal is based on ownership rights, which brings
into sharp focus the question of inclusion, and
thus becomes the instrument through which to dissect
who owns the physical resources, the human resources,
and the nation itself – and whether, in
fact, anyone can claim to own these. Most pertinently,
the question presents itself: who owns the 1990
constitution? And, consequently, who is the owner
or manager of the government that has been formed
under its auspices? Beginning with these questions,
Upreti presented a review of the 1990 constitution,
with suggestions for improvements and recommendations
for electoral reform.
Exploring the question of ownership, Upreti
said that tribal leaders claim ownership of all
resources in their territorial domain, as do dictatorial
regimes, in which the dictator claims sole ownership
of territory, resources and human resources. Nepal
faced a situation of such hegemonic control of
the state during the Rana regime, which lasted
until 1950. However, questions of ownership remain
pertinent even in a democratic set-up.
The two basic ideas of democracy are: a) majoritarian
rule whereby one privileged class/group owns the
country; and b) rule by consensus where the government,
which represents all the people, is by the people.
Upreti said that consensual democracy is more
appropriate for Nepal, given its diversity of
ethnicity and deep class divisions. The first
kind of rule, where the government of the minority
governs in the name of the majority, works in
relatively homogenous societies.
In Nepal, though, a government of the minority
has ruled in the name of the minority and in the
interests of the minority even after democracy
arrived in 1990 under the present constitution.
The 1990 constitution, modelled on the lines of
the Westminster system, has failed to deliver
true democracy in Nepal, and has excluded large
sections of society in the years that it has been
operative. The degree of exclusion in Nepal’s
governance is startlingly represented in the fact
that under the electoral process mandated by the
1990 constitution, more than 60 per cent of the
votes are excluded from the government formation
process. The constitution also has no provision
for the devolution of power from the centre to
the regional to the grassroots level, which is
reflected in the fact that only 40 per cent of
the national budget is allocated outside the centre.
Presenting caste-disaggregated data on parliamentary
representation, Upreti said 41 per cent of the
population occupies 84.9 per cent of the seats
in parliament, while over 58 per cent has only
15 per cent of the seats. These figures show that
the current political system is structurally flawed.
Nepal has had the peculiar situation of parliament
being elected thrice but dismissed four times
in 12 years. This is a reflection of how governance
has been at the mercy of the whims of the ruling
elites, such that the prime minister of a highly
unrepresentative system, one in which power is
concentrated at the centre, has the authority
to dissolve parliament at will.
Had the judiciary been stronger, it may have
acted as a check and balance, but its weakness
is well reflected in the fact that for each of
the dismissals that have been challenged in court,
it has returned a verdict that conflicts with
the other verdicts.
In some other countries that have suffered a democratic
deficit, governments have been known to take ameliorative
measures, but this did not happen in Nepal. Upreti
recommended that since the structure itself was
flawed, Nepal needed a constitutional revision.
Whether a complete overhaul was required or whether
it is a question of reforming the existing constitution
is an issue that needs to be debated. The modalities
of the debate are not of supreme relevance as
long as it ensures that the final text guarantees
consensus democracy. His suggestion was that the
debate be carried out in two stages, the first
focussing on arriving at a consensus on the basic
principles, and the second on whether the constituent
assembly should be elected or selected. He proposed
that the South African example could be a possible
model.
Upreti said that the monarchy in the present
system had failed to play a ‘cementing’
role, and therefore a new system should be devised
that combined the monarchy and permanent institutions
of an inclusive nature. Institutional inclusion
could be achieved as it had been in South Africa,
Sri Lanka and Switzerland, through a system of
proportional representation. He ended saying that
it is important to enable the creation of inclusive
institutions through electoral reforms.
* * *
Questions and comments
Pratyoush Onta drew attention to the context
in which the 1990 constitution was drawn, with
the baggage of 30 years of Panchayat rule. He
said that the discourse has tended to centre on
the 1990 constitution without any attempt to locate
it in its historical context. Suggesting that
the first level of analysis should be of the political
play that informs any process of constitution
building, he said it is important to draw lessons
from the situation in which the 1990 constitution
was formulated, and apply the lessons to the political
situation now.
Picking up from Onta’s point about context,
Krishna Hachhethu said that politics need not
always relate to power, and that the time is not
yet right to frame a constitution. He said there
must first be a greater degree of popular mobilisation
before power entered the current political equation.
The very basis of representation was questioned
by some, who challenged the assumption that the
interests of a particular group are best represented
by a member of that group. Girish Kharel said
that representatives in the current system are
chosen on the basis of ideology. He asked whether
the panel was suggesting that votes be cast along
ethnic lines.
Rhoderick Chalmers had three observations. These
were that tribal leaders and dictators exercise
ownership rights but cannot claim ownership; the
government ‘of the people, by the people,
for the people’ formulation is well recognised
as only a platitude that ignores the reality of
politics; and that the system of proportional
representation, whereby people vote for a local
candidate, follows a list system that in fact
concentrates power in the hand of the party’s
central leadership. It also leaves room for horse-trading.
He recommended that the pros and cons of a majoritarian
system and proportional representation be carefully
weighed in light of a Nepali reality, which is
unique. He also reminded the participants that
it would be useful to remember while embracing
the South African example, as had been done by
many presenters, that for all practical purposes,
South Africa is a one-party state.
It was observed that the Bahun-Chhetri bias
in nomination lists is a result of decisions taken
at the central party level, which would continue
under proportional representation, whereas even
under the current electoral system, nominees are
usually local candidates. Unless accompanied by
federalism, proportional representation would
in all likelihood fail to deliver the benefits
that are expected from it. It would be fair to
expect that federalism will change political behaviour
and current equations.
Responding to Onta and Hachhetu, Upreti said
that the 1990 constitution is the product of compromise.
Defending the proportional representation system,
he said that even in the UK, where the Westminster
system originated, the electoral process is being
reviewed, as it is in the United States. Proportional
representation does not necessarily have to mean
‘one person, one vote’, but can be
implemented through a number of other modalities.
In response to a question about the judiciary,
Upreti said that the role of the Supreme Court
is a contentious issue. In the way that the judges
are elected, there is little scope of independence
from the government. In verdicts in the past,
it has seemed that the judiciary functions more
like a bureaucracy than in the manner of professionals.
* * *
Michael Hutt/Ideal Nepal and the voices
of Nepali writers
Prefacing his presentation with the rider that
he thought it was inappropriate for foreigners
to be in Kathmandu, criticising the system in
Nepal and positing solutions found in foreign
contexts, Michael Hutt said he had chosen to examine
“how Nepal speaks to itself and presents
itself to the outside world”, rather than
how others speak of and to it. Thus, Michael Hutt
traced the history of literature in Nepal, delving
into its comprehension if its own world, primarily
focussing on the poetry of the 20th century poet,
Bhupi Sherchan.
Commenting on the importance of literature in
Nepal, Hutt observed that while literature was
given its due importance as literature, there
was a disjuncture between what were deemed literary
writings and the discourse in other spheres of
thinking on socio-political issues. However, he
pointed out that there are signs that this is
changing, as literature comes out of its ghetto
with authors such as Manjushree Thapa (The Tutor
of History) maintaining regular columns in newspapers
such as Nepali Times. Hutt also referred to the
essays of Laxmi Prasad Devkota, some of the most
important commentary available on Nepal and his
imaginings of an ideal Nepal. Laxmi Prasad Devkota
is not commonly read out of choice, however, in
spite of his historical relevance.
Hutt traced the evolution of Nepali literature’s
references to the country from the classical ideal
of 20th-century poetry, where notions of reclusion
and purity were cherished, through the romantic
trend informed by an ideological streak, to the
discussion of Nepal as imperfect but reparable.
In modern times, Nepali literature has been remarkably
revolutionary, expressing a need for social churning
and overturning the status quo. However, such
writings have tended to be unspecific about the
future ‘dawn’, without a definite
picture or ideal of post-revolution Nepal. From
the 1960s onwards, literature been more individualised,
and currently, it is gaining in nuance.
Pointing out the shortcomings in the sphere
of literature in Nepal, Hutt said that there is
a problem of channelisation; certain writers become
prominent because they are read by certain readers,
and so are predominate in discussions about literature.
This channelling starts with the school syllabus,
which highlights some works and not others.
There is also a disconnection with reality in
much of Nepali literature, which is reflected
in the paucity of autobiographies and biographies.
Returning to Bhupi, Hutt read out an extract
from the poem Mero Chowk, in which Bhupi speaks
of poverty and the misrepresentation of history.
Bhupi also wrote about alienation, on the issue
of the lahurey or migrants, and spoke of Nepalis
being brave but not wise. Hutt said that such
writing needed to be heard outside of the literary
sphere, for its value and potential to be socially
and politically enlightened.
* * *
Questions and comments
Commenting on exclusionary tendencies in the
Nepali literary sphere, Prakash A. Raj said that
even in Darjeeling, where the population is predominantly
of Nepali origin, writers belong to various ethnic
groups. But, in Nepal, even in literature –
writing, publishing and criticism – there
is bahunbaad. And, Bhupi is ignored by the elites
for being a janjati.
Manjushree Thapa pointed out to exclusions in
literature as well, on the basis of gender and
caste. In the case of Bhupi, who has been appraised
as being a progressive, his writings either mythologise
women or portray images of them that are regressive.
In contemporary Nepali writing, the image of the
collective is very strong.
Taking off from Hutt’s point about the
difficulty of Nepali works receiving their due
space in the literature on Nepal, which is now
dominated by Western writings on development,
Pratyoush Onta said the political economy of being
a Nepali scholar outside Nepal places certain
limitations on the scope for Nepal to enter the
mainstream of global social science. At the moment,
for social scientists from outside Nepal, it is
not viable to invest in Nepal for a large part
of the cost is the necessity of first learning
Nepali. To be a Nepal scholar, it is imperative
to have fluency in the language, whereas in subjects
on other parts of South Asia, having the local
language may not be necessary.
Hutt’s point about the isolation of literature
from spheres of public life was contested by the
observation that in that there was an official
‘canon’ of sorts in the Panchayat
era, and in the burning and banning of such popular
works as B.P. Koirala’s Sumnima, it is clear
that literature has not existed in a vacuum. One
view was that progressive literature needs to
trace its roots and build a genealogy going back
at least as far as Laxmi Prasad Devkota.
Hutt agreed that there was bahunbaad in sahitya
(literature), positing the reason for it as Bahuns
having greater access to education. Accepting
Majushree Thapa’s observation, Hutt said
that the lack of criticism on Bhupi could possibly
have to do with him being a prized popular writer;
it may also have to do with the dearth of literally
criticism generally, or of Bhupi’s political
views.
He contested Onta’s point about Nepali being
an unviable career investment for foreign scholars,
saying that there may be issues of accessibility
vis-à-vis Nepali works, a lot of which
are now in translation, but there is no problem
of availability. In the School of Oriental and
African Studies, London, for example, it is possible
to acquire the language even while reading for
a social science degree.
Hutt protested an assertion that came up in
the questions-round that literature and social
science are separate spheres, and gave the example
of the West where the two are well acknowledged
as having overlapping interests.
Saturday, April 26
Morning, Shankar Hall
Session: Institutional exclusion I
Chair: David Gellner
Presenter: Tanka Subba
Teeka Bhattarai and Bijaya Subba
Mahendra Lawoti
* * *
Tanka Subba/‘Inclusion’
in Indian democracy: lessons for Nepal
In India, the terms ‘affirmative action’
and ‘reservation’ are used interchangeably.
India’s practice of protective discrimination
dates to the early 20th century, specifically
to the concessions granted to Muslims in 1909.
Over the course of the last century, protective
discrimination became entrenched in non-Brahminical
movements throughout the Subcontinent. The guiding
idea was that depressed castes/classes need special
protection, and that the state must assume responsibility
for this. This concept is enshrined in the constitution
of India.
During the early years of independent India,
lists of protected castes/classes were developed
and expanded. Under the Moraji government, the
Mandal Commission was formed, and V.P. Singh’s
decision to offer reservations in accordance with
the commission’s recommendations sparked
massive protests and litigation.
In spite of these policies, little change was
made in the caste system; instead, the caste system
adapted itself to the policies. Many people argue
that affirmative action policies have created
a ‘creamy layer’ among the tribes.
There have been advances in tribal representation,
but not necessarily in intra-tribal relations.
Scholars argue that reservations have reinforced
existing social structures within the hierarchy.
In any event, as the state withdraws from its
role in the market place as a job provider, its
ability to assist egalitarian social projects
through reservations is diminished. Moreover,
with the failure of many tribals to complete education,
the reservation policies have not helped them
out. These people know that they are members of
scheduled tribes, but they are unable to capitalise
on it; they are the excluded among the included.
Inclusion creates exclusion in some ways. Initially,
in 1956, many groups resisted being stigmatised
with a label, and some ‘upper’ groups
took pride in not being dubbed as ‘reserved’
or ‘backward’. But the high caste
response to the reservation system began to change
in the late 1970s, and some institutions had to
temporarily close in the face of violent protests
in 1980 after the Mandal Commission’s recommendations
were made public. Ahmedabad witnessed 404 days
of disturbances.
Oddly, the same groups received different allotments
in different states. In Arunachal Pradesh, Brahmins
became a scheduled tribe. But in the Northeast,
because nearly everyone falls in a reservation,
anti-reservation sentiment is weak. These issues
have not made much impact among the Nepali diaspora
in Darjeeling. Violent outbursts have not occurred;
cooptation is more common.
The Nepali language is one of the national languages
of India used in education and writing. Still,
Nepalis have often faced harassment throughout
the Northeast. Moraji Desai said that Nepali was
not a national language of India, which angered
many Nepali-speakers and in part contributed to
the Gorakhali movement. Some Indians imbibed paternalistic
British attitudes toward Nepalis, and others saw
them only as settlers. In response, many Nepalis
in India have stressed their connections to India
and adopted monikers that stress their Indian-ness.
The Indian system of reservations is not suitable
for Nepal. Instead, Nepal needs a more inclusive
system that draws on the lessons of the Northeast.
Protective discrimination is necessary, but it
must be qualified. Reservations should be made
on indicators of backwardness, which could be
done by identifying the most needy at the local
level. Families would get 10 years to develop,
after which they would lose their protection.
This would help avoid the politics of victimisation.
Nepal’s social discrimination is more
cultural-linguistic than political. Some groups
demand regional autonomy, but regional autonomy
without economic independence is meaningless.
There are few districts in Nepal with an overwhelming
majority of one group; the solution is in making
each group feel that it is represented. Political
and social development would diffuse tensions
by leading to intra-caste competition rather than
inter-caste competition.
-----
Because his travel plans required an early departure,
Tanka Subba took questions and offered responses
before the other presentations were delivered.
-----
Questions, which came in two waves with Subba
offering a round of responses in between, covered
a wide range of issues related to minority communities
in India and Nepal. One panellist asked who/what
is seen as the oppressor among ethnic Nepalis
in India, and noted that in Nepal it is Hindu
hegemony. Another asked about how OBC groups in
India adjust their culture to become the beneficiaries
of positive discrimination, followed by a question
about the impact of global economic changes on
India’s reservation system. Other questions
relying on comparisons between India and Nepal
probed the influence of Indian politics on janjati
activists in Nepal, the changing of caste names
when Nepalis migrate to India and the possible
promise this strategy might hold for Dalits, and
the differing use of the terms ‘tribe’
and ‘ethnic group’ in India and Nepal.
Subba was also requested to more fully elaborate
on his political recommendations for Nepal and
discuss B.R. Ambedker’s influence on the
Indian constitution with respect to reservations.
Subba opened his response by noting that, in
India, the dominant Other is student bodies. These
groups draw their membership from local, non-Nepali
populations and sometimes organise campaigns against
ethnic Nepalis in India. On the second question,
he argued that cultural change among OBCs in India
had been happening for some time, and that it
usually involved reviving practices or traditions
in order to signify themselves as unique. Subba
said that the impact of global economic changes
on the reservation system in India were complicated
and difficult to assess. On the other India-Nepal
questions, Subba argued that many janjati activists
had been influenced by India because they either
study there or through conscious modelling of
agitation strategies. He discussed the practice
of name-changing by noting the some groups, particularly
Newars, did change their names on migrating to
India, and that this might hold some promise for
disadvantaged communities. Concerning terminology,
Subba explained that the term ‘tribal’
was used in India while Nepal used ‘ethnic
groups’, and that the two terms were not
interchangeable because they have different meanings
in the two places. Nonetheless, some people are
now using the term ‘tribal’ in Nepal,
showing that concepts can colonise new areas even
without official sanction. Subba’s political
recommendations did include a policy of reservations,
but he emphasised that positive economic discrimination
must be linked to actual conditions. Finally,
concerning Ambedkar and India’s reservation
policy, Subba explained that Ambedkar had wanted
reservations to exist for only a decade after
the framing of the constitution, and that the
current system of expansive reservations was a
deviation from his original plan. Also, various
bodies have influenced reservation policy since
it was first enacted; the supreme court, for example,
capped reservations at 50 per cent of the population.
* * *
Mahendra Lawoti/Inclusive democratic
institutions in Nepal
This presentation on exclusionary democracy
in Nepal is mostly prescriptive, although more
detailed analysis can be found in the distributed
paper. Generally speaking, this country has a
serious exclusion problem in all of its institutions,
including parliament and the bureaucracy. Nor
is this problem confined to a bygone age; in certain
respects, rather than alleviate the problem, post-1990
democracy has actually worsened it. The likely
outcomes of this situation are various and troubling:
ethnic violence, the endangering of democracy,
perhaps even a threat to the unity of Nepal.
Solutions to the exclusionary democracy problem
must take a broad view of the problem and not
address themselves to solitary institutions. Among
others, solutions include increasing federalism
and reservations, accelerating constitutional
reforms and, more generally, securing the protection
of rights. There are also problems rooted in the
electoral structure, in particular the first-past-the-post
system, which does not represent the interests
of the marginalised electorate. Inclusive democracy
implies broad-based participation in decision-making
processes and in the formulation of public policies.
The scale of exclusion in Nepali society is
truly expansive; the elite dominates even progressive
realms like the media and human rights groups.
Cultural discrimination plays itself out in discrimination
based on language and religion, and more broadly
in the limiting of access to resources. Exclusion
in Nepal goes beyond culture, however, and includes
discrimination based on ethnic/caste status, language,
class, gender, region and religion.
Nepal’s current institutions are fundamentally
shaped by their exclusionary orientation. Majoritarian
institutions, such as those adopted by Nepal,
work in majority societies, not in multicultural
ones. Consensus institutions would be more appropriate
here. Majoritarian institutions worsen class cleavages,
and in Nepal they are imbued with caste-Hindu
values, which has the effect of limiting individual
rights. Because the constitution is geared towards
certain groups, individuals from those groups
enjoy protection under the law not afforded to
all citizens. There are any number of objections
one could raise against the present political
structure, from its racist and sexist assumptions
to its unfair dismissal of multilingualism and
restrictions on rights of association.
An overview of the present constitution’s
supporters and detractors exposes the interests
at play. Advocates are primarily male Bahuns,
while opposition is found in most other parts
of society, but most strongly among the most disadvantaged.
It is important here to draw a distinction between
criticising the highly imperfect institutions
of a democracy and maligning democracy itself.
A political structure based on the principle
of inclusion would possess many benefits. It would
help to promote equality and justice, consolidate
and deepen democracy, and mitigate violent ethnic
conflicts. Moreover, it would address the concerns
of Maoists, adivasis-janjatis, madhesis, and Muslims,
all of whom are angry with the present set-up.
The ideal structure to replace the existing
one would draw on many influences, but essentially
be consensus-building in outlook rather than majoritarian.
The philosophical foundations for such a model
come from the work of John Rawls, who advocated
a system blind to an individual’s racial,
gender, ethnic/caste, religious and class when
making decisions. Another aspect should be promoting
justice for the weak.
One practical model of achieving these aims
is federalism. Such a system could provide the
right balance of state action and decentralisation,
allowing inclusion through cultural autonomy,
empowering marginalised groups, and moulding public
policy to better reflect the interests of the
entire public. There are also opportunities for
better management of ethnic conflict, for more
efficient and responsive administration, for regionally-balanced
economic development, and for more decentralisation
and local-level experimentation.
Federalism in Nepal would need to be based on
a strong commitment to regional and local autonomy.
There would have to be allowances made for the
formation of new regions and sub-regions as necessary,
and given the ethnic and linguistic patchwork
of the country, there would have to be a degree
of non-territorial autonomy. At the national level,
rather than a conventional parliament, the country
could have a house of nationalities based on equitable
representation of all groups in the country.
Some people doubt the ability of federalism
to transform Nepal. One common argument is that
Nepal is too small for federalism to work effectively.
However, Nepal is much larger than many states
which have successful federal systems. Another
argument is that federalism will only lead to
the creation of ‘new minorities’ springing
up to exploit the system, but there are reasonable
safeguards that can be implemented to prevent
this. Finally, particularly in light of the country’s
political problems, there is a fear of secession,
although really this argument is counter-intuitive
as it is the lack of autonomy, rather than its
presence, that pushes people toward secession
and violence.
The proposal advanced here argues for the formation
of 13 regions in the country representing different
groups. At the national level, this would combine
in a system of proportional representation and
power sharing. Reservations would be provided
in education, public employment and politics as
necessary. People objecting to reservations should
acknowledge that since 1854 a small group has
dominated the entire country through what is essentially
a system of narrow reservation for them. Moreover,
with some limited reservations already in place
for women, reservations already have precedence
in principle.
Another important challenge is reforming the
examination system, which in its present form
is conducted only in Nepali. If other groups had
meaningful access to this system, they would improve
their standing over time. As for promoting social
stability, consider south India, where reservations
have been aggressively promoted for years.
Some critics of reservations are motivated by
genuine concern about changing the system. But
criticising and reforming a system are not the
same things as rejecting one, and the present
system is in bad need of renovation. Countries
lacking natural resources need human resources
for their development, and the political structure
must facilitate such progress.
* * *
Questions and comments
Mahendra Lawoti’s presentation on federalism
generated comments mainly about the practical
aspects of his proposal. For instance, one commenter
noted that while federalism may be a good national-level
model, the challenge of empowering people at the
local level remained. He also cast doubt on the
possibility of constructing a federal structure
along ethnic lines, as Nepal is perhaps too diverse
and ethnic groups too widely intermingled for
this to work. Another respondent offered an anecdotal
example of long-term change in society by pointing
out that while his own grandfather was a porter,
today he is a member of the English-speaking elite.
Broad evolutionary changes in society should not
be forgotten in the search for specific policy
solutions, and the questioner asked what effect
an ethnic-federal model might have on polarising
the country into discordant groups. Lawoti also
received a question about intra-ethnic group economic
disparities along the rural-urban divide, and
how political measures might address this. Finally,
an audience member asked what effect Lawoti’s
proposals might have on creating new violence
in the country, arguing that reforms could provoke
as much tension in society as they resolve.
Lawoti responded by first offering a summary
of his proposal, and saying that its policy recommendations
were tentative. If people wanted to modify the
system at a local level or alter its ethnic-based
categories, he argued that the system could accommodate
it. In so far as empowering local people is concerned,
Lawoti stated that federal models are the best
agent for carrying this out because they devolve
central planning and give people more control
over their lives, even if it is initially only
at a regional level. On the divergent interests
of rural and urban ethnic groups, he argued that
these may not be as significant as they seem at
first glance, and he cited the example of janjatis,
who he said share common political goals regardless
of economic station or physical location. Moreover,
he said, federalism would help rural groups to
advance economically, as comparative advantage
industries would spring up in a system that allowed
greater local discretion. Lastly, in response
to the violence question, Lawoti argued that the
current dispensation was beset with turmoil already,
and that the Maoist insurgency attracted members
of minority communities. Whatever the short-term
consequences, if grievances are not addressed,
there can be no stable peace in the country in
the long-term.
* * *
Teeka Bhattarai and Bijaya Subba/Disabled
democracy: Leaders lacking political consciousness
By democracy, we simply mean the democratic
practice of the last 12 years for the purpose
of this presentation.. Our thesis is that the
lack of awareness in the political leadership
is the reason why democracy is being disabled.
We have spent 10-11 years of the 12 years of multiparty
democracy in the villages from where we have tried
to look at the last 12 years. But we were able
to deal with only one aspect in this paper.
In 2000 we undertook a socio-economic-ecological
survey of 5 VDCs of Achham. Some 40 per cent of
the respondents did not know that the system had
changed from Panchayat to multiparty democracy.
We believe the leaders were too interested to
get the votes of the people and there was nobody
explain what the new system meant.
Leadership and bureaucracy were conditioned
to partyless system of governance. People could
not find substantive changes in the behaviour
of the leaders before and after 1990. They came,
they asked for votes and they gave speeches and
they went away—pretty much the same as in
the past.
We have looked at three forms of exclusion and
these form the basis of our argument. The three
forms are gender, ethnicity and geographic region.
The third one is perhaps a new aspect that is
not being looked into that way. We have chosen
the elections of 1958, 1962, 1981, 1991 and 1999
for analysis. The workshop has gone much further
where the trend of exclusion is being claimed
for over the centuries. We try not to repeat what
has already been said and give a glimpse of the
difference between the Panchayat and democratic
era with a few graphs.
In terms of gender, parties have not moved ahead
other than fielding 5 per cent of women candidates
for general elections. Women’s representation
in the central committees of UML and NC is similar.
This is nothing new or unexpected . If we see
the people’s council of the Maoists the
only apex body membership of which has been made
public, the gender representation does not look
any good. We don’t know how that has been
compensated in other organs.
Looking at the ethnic representation in legislative
membership the trend is clear throghout the whole
period: over-representation of high hill castes
followed by hill indigenous groups, Tarai high
caste groups, Newars and so on. It is possible
that this classification can be contested. Exclusion
has been looked at from the development paradigm
rather than the sociological and political one
which we consider have significant overlaps.
Next, we looked ethnic representation at party
central committees. There were no substantive
difference between the two major political parties:
UML and NC: high hill castes dominate the composition.
Tarai dalits and hill dalits are zero. Even in
the people’s council of the Maoists there
is no substantive difference. But there is higher
representation of other hill indigenous groups
but we do not know what kind of structure there
is within the Maoist structure of governance.
We then looked at geographic representation and
on the basis of the state’s resource distribution.
We have looked at the expenditure in the past
five years. We have put the three west subdivisions
together as ‘West’ for the purposes
of this paper. The west has 42 per cent of the
population, but only 14 per cent of the central
committee members of the NC are from the west
and 9 per cent of UML central committee members
are from the west (although the two committees
have comparable numbers they are not exactly comparable).
The central region has 35 per cent of the population
but takes 70 per cent of the state’s resources.
Of this, 58 per cent is taken by Kathmandu district
alone. There is a concentration of political power
in the east but fund allocation is not in the
same proportion if we base our analysis on the
representation in the apex bodies of the two parties.
We have included budget allocation between 2054
and 2060 because we could not get data for the
past 12 years. Eighty per cent of the development
budget is spent through central level and 20 per
cent through the local.
We also looked at exclusion from the point of
view of service delivery. To illustrate this,
we have two cases. The first case is about free
education. The UML government announced free education
up to Grade X when it came to power. Among the
Chepangs, where we worked, there were only five
students who had finished Grade V. It shows where
were the resources going.
The second is the case of uterus prolapse cases
amongst women. Already in the 1960s, 1500 uterus
prolapse cases were treated in Pokhara. It is
astonishing why nobody—the government, the
donors bothered with it. It is estimated that
at least 10 per cent of the women in Nepal are
affected by this. This means more than two and
a half million people are affected. Nobody bothered,
we think, because women did not have a voice.
There are 58-60,000 people reportedly affected
by HIV AIDS but it gets so much attention but
prolapse gets almost none.
Saturday, April 26
Afternoon, Nuptse Hall
Session: Institutional exclusion II
Chair: Lynn Bennett
Presenters: Anup Pahari
Seira Tamang
Deepak Gyawali
Hari Roka
* * *
Anup Pahari/From liberation to insurgency:
The politics of paradoxes in Nepal, 1990-2003
In the present situation in Nepal two paradoxes
can be identified:
a) Why did an armed Maoist struggle/movement gain
attraction so fast and so quickly since 1990,
the period of greatest political openness and
not in the four decades earlier when Nepal was
ruled autocratically and the geopolitics favoured
such a movement?
b) Why did a revolutionary left agenda gain momentum
in Nepal at precisely the historical moment when
the critical mass of the Nepali Left movement
accepted a non-revolutionary democratic path to
power and was in the process of establishing a
lasting electoral hold in power and all its implications
for a left agenda?
This is not a protest or a grievance but a full-blown
textbook Maoist insurgency, if we look at the
language it has used and the tactics it has employed.
Between 1945 and 1983 of the 22 countries that
went through a full-blown socialist Maoist/Marxist
revolution not a single one of them had democracy
in place. Nepal was like Peru which a Maoist movement
in a country moving towards a democratic transition.
We have to ask ourselves not why we have a Maoist
insurgency but why do we have Maoist insurgency
in the midst of a collective democratic effort.
Left insurgencies take place against colonisation
or if there is a vilified ruler but there was
neither in Nepal in 1996. So we need to look at
what the 1990 movement was. The 1990 movement
was conceived by political parties, it was not
a grassroots movement with the participation of
the rural populace. It was a movement that succeeded
in putting in place a key framework, a democratic
polity and constitutional monarchy. It did not
rout the ancien regime though the old guard was
significantly weakened. It brought about liberation
among political parties, their leadership, their
cadre, members of the civil society—students,
journalists and urban professionals. It was not
a movement that brought about liberation to those
at the bottom of the Nepali society.
Why was the democratic system vulnerable to
insurgency? The polity had to be depicted as something
else in order for it to be vulnerable to Maoist
assault on it. The Maoist were not able to assault
it directly as a democracy and they have never
accepted that it was a full-fledged democracy.
Assault on democracy begins at two levels—one
is the external assault that is the Maoist assault
the other is internal, the self-inflicted wounds
of the insurgency. The external assault by the
Maoist is vilification that the system is undemocratic
and fundamentally nothing has changed since 1990.
Democracy was destroyed in language by the Maoists.
The internal assault was that the Maoists set
a political ideological trap and the state fell
right into it. They argued for its inherent undemocratic
character and it did so by two methods—by
tampering with the fundamentals of what defines
a democracy. So the Maoists argued that the state
was undemocratic and at crucial moments the state
acted undemocratically and proved the Maoists
right. It did not do so universally, but did it
in enough places and enough times to convince
a key sector in Nepali society that the regime
was undemocratic indeed. There was no democracy
that the Maoists were up against, it was less
than democracy.
A question why there wasn’t a movement
from autocracy of the Panchayat to revolution?
Why was there a democracy in the interim. The
answer may lie in that the opposition to Panchayat
autocracy always said that the answer was democracy
not revolution despite the fact that Nepal has
had a vibrant left movement since the Second World
War, even in the darkest days of the Panchayat.
The coming of democracy has eased the argument
for revolution since the oppression was collective.
Once that equality of oppression was removed in
1990 it was the inequality of political party
fortunes. A theoretical democracy is hard to attack.
The Maoist had it easier to attack a real democracy
rather than a theoretical democracy. The Maoists
showed that the real democracy was not a real
democracy.
Looking at the second paradox, one needs to
look at the role of the left ideology which was
not strong enough in the left movement. UML has
gone through a series of changes between 1975
and 1990 and it accepted constitutional monarchy
without a constituent assembly, thus bringing
the left to the centre. Contrast this with the
other ideology of fight against revision as highlighted
by Comrade Prachanda. With the rise of Pajero
communism in Nepal and corruption, the UML proved
the Maoists right. There has also been a series
of failure in reform, redistribution and growth.
This again lays emphasis on the role of the ideology
as fundamental as no common cause can be found
between a viable left and an aspiring left.
Dealing with transformation, questions also
arise about whether it is good or bad for the
interests of the ethnic groups to migrate to the
Maoists and abandon or question participation
in mainstream political parties. Is it viable
in the long run? Is the Maoist movement a long-term
viable vehicle for their expression and realisation
of ethnic rights and equality, etc? Or will this
vehicle swallow this for its own purpose?
Questions
1. Wasn’t it a failure of development, the
ideology of development that has occupied the
minds of the leaders after 1990?
2. Among the many lapses the major lapse was
that the democratic parties did not go to the
grassroots. Policy and posts were important and
the Maoists were smart enough to take advantage
of this vacuum. Second, some regard must also
be given to the experience of the Maoists political
wing—the Samyukta Jana Morcha—in the
parliament. They tried to introduce changes that
were completely unheard of by the mainstream political
parties. That was also partly to blame.
3. Maoists are championing the cause of janjatis,
madhesis and women’s groups, right to self
determination. The Maoists support federal structure.
Do you think these Maoists will be able solve
the expectations of the janjatis on the basis
of the experience so far?
4. The ethnic minorities issues and Maoist movement
are joining forces. This is a wrong interpretation
as the ethnic question predates the Maoist movement.
It is just a strategy of the Maoists. Prachanda
says that the tribal groups are emancipated and
therefore we trust them more, they are fighters.
The Maoists have co-opted the already existing
issues. Insurgency will therefore not be the leading
ethnic movement in Nepal.
5. When the Maoist movement started most of
the communities were tribal in nature which was
exploited by the Panchayat and the Congress also
exploited it. There were the tribal norms and
values but those of the nation-state were imposed.
Most of the ethnic groups and peoples are in deprivation.
Almost 71 percent of the those under the poverty
line are from the indigenous group. Class concept
is very much relevant to the ethnic groups. They
are suppressed and not given autonomy. But Maoists
say that they will be given autonomy so they are
attracted to the Maoists.
Answers
1. If you go through the paper I have addressed
the failure of distribution and growth in conjunction
with reform. I take that to include failure in
development and socio-economic outcome.
2. In answer to the second question I would
like to quote from my paper: ‘Over the past
12 years, the Maoists have understood the weakest
links of the Nepali electoral democracy. The weakest
links are at the margins—regional margins,
ethnic-state margins, caste margins and ethnic
margins. And this is precisely where the insurgency
is burning at its hottest.’ This has been
documented. I by no means wanted to ignore that.
There is also the acknowledgement that a large
part of the population mobilised by the Maoists
was never successfully brought under the fold
of any major political party. The point about
Samyukta Jan Morcha is well taken although I would
question the strategy to take up arms. More time
should have been given to change.
3. Where will the Maoist and ethnic question
go? Lenin made all sorts of promises to soviet
republics but look at what happened to those promises.
It took the collapse of the Berlin Wall for the
ethnic issues to be revived after 70 years. The
Chinese were not quite as unmindful as the Russians
were. So they use the term soviet social imperialism.
But try telling that to the Tibetans that the
Chinese have been kind to the Tibetans. This is
a marriage of convenience.
4. On the ethnic grievances and the Maoist movement,
the relationship is so deep seated that the underlying
relationship is a complex relation.
* * *
Seira Tamang/Civilising civil society:
Donors and democratic space
The concept of history of civil society is very
long, from Hegel to Marx, Gramsci, Adam Smith
to de Tocqueville. In Nepal the concept is derived
from the liberal tradition only because it has
been sieved through development like many of our
other concepts. Consequently concepts have been
sanitised and have limited utility - this is not
a Nepal-specific phenomenon but happens all over
the world especially given the unwillingness to
interrogate the concept is a world-wide phenomenon.
Two main ways in which one can understand civil
society can be given here—liberal and Marxist.
What is civil society is generally agreed upon—it
is coordinated activity between the individual
and the household that goes beyond the confines
of the state. It is an arena of associational
culture and it implies a sense of collective action.
Broadly, it serves as a bridge between the realm
of society and state. The bridge can be built
from the society towards the state where society
imposes its norms upon the working of the state
or in the other direction from the state to the
society in which the state dominates. The liberal
ideas of civil society in the form of societal
norms being imposed on the state dominate in Nepal.
I will now interoggate the assumptions of this
liberal civil society and the manner in which
it functions in bikase Nepal.
Nepal’s 1990 revolution followed on the
heels of the late 1980s revolution of east Europe
in a period in which foreign aid was channeled
into the construction of civil society. This followed
the global belief in the period—the third
wave of democratisation and belief of people power.
It was believed democracy could be institutionalised
via the assistance of external forces if domestic
actors were lacking or weak. Therefore strengthening
NGO capacity and civil society and political liberalisation
have been central to the new policy agenda of
multilateral and bilateral agencies. The economic
point of view reduces the role of the state, and
the NGOs and the private sector become ideal service
deliverers. From the political point of view civil
society organisations develop civic culture which
forms the bastion to combat non-democratic power
which threaten the state.
What do civic groups need to do in order to
maintain democratic stability? Internally civic
groups inspire habits of cooperation, solidarity,
public-spiritedness, and trust. Externally, these
networks aggregate networks and articulate demand
to ensure the government’s accountability
to citizens.
But to be clarified is the fact that it is assumed
that NGOs are democratically structured internally,
which is an error. It is believed that in order
to work in civil society, you have to work for
democratic goals which is also an error. For example,
World Hindu Federation is part of civil society
but does not work towards democratic goals. Furthermore
it is not clear if more civil society means more
democracy. It has been argued that too much civil
society gave rise to Nazis. And most importantly
for the purposes of this paper what needs to be
made clear is that civic association kind of arguments
don’t take into account international influence
which impact the two key components of civic theorist
argument—horizontal ties and the norms of
reciprocity. There is no sense of culpability
of how foreign aid has led to and has ramifications
on how the present conflict in Nepal has emerged.
We need to think about how foreign aid has led
to the way we imagine civil society in terms of
the ramifications for reciprocity and trust.
In Nepal, groups that have received aid are
not more likely to develop with accountability
to citizens or state, which is crucial. Neither
are they more likely to be more involved with
other civic groups. Instead, these groups are
removed from the groups they claim to represent.
They are closer to western funders than the population
they represent. Few are involved in activities
concerned with civic-ness. Studies in post-communist
Russia have shown that foreign aid does little
to help groups’ abilities to instill habits
of cooperativeness, solidarity, public spiritedness
and trust. A study in Russia’s women’s
movement has shown foreign aid has fostered internal
rivalry, jealousies and overall divisiveness.
There are clear parallels in Nepal. In Nepal it
is more important to get funding than make an
impact in the community. Groups engage in cooperative
and competitive behaviour with other civic groups.
There is an argument that aid has given rise to
a distinct civic elite. There has been discussions
that development reinforces hierarchies, caste/ethnic
and so on. It might have more negative repercussions
than that if we think of civil society as democratic
space that needs forms of association and a clear
flow of information. English speaking Nepali elite
function as gatekeepers of information for donors,
who seek to fund because donors need to fund to
exist. If the elite are sieving information, are
making decisions for funders who not speak Nepali,
that is a huge problem in terms of the way information
flows in a democratic polity. How much information
is sieved by the new elite and the manner in which
consultants sign confidentiality statements and
donor funded reports are not always made publicly
available raises questions as to how donors are
actually impacting the sphere of civil society.
There is also the distance between civic associations
which are based in the rural areas and those based
in the centre because of language and easy access
to donor circles in the capital.
From the donors’ side, donors need to
fund and thus there are cases where ethics take
a backseat. There is a moral dilemma in funding.
Furthermore US support is tied to geopolitics.
Donors acquiesced to the king’s move to
remove the Deuba government and install one of
his choice. The rights of people were dismissed.
In conclusion, we in the state are as much responsible
for what the state does as we reproduce statist
ideas. Furthermore, civil society needs the state
to protect the rights. If INGOs and NGOs are given
more authority, it erodes the ability of the state
to protect our rights. And finally it is not at
all clear that civil society is the only way for
political participation. There are other ways
for people to be political. Civil society is not
the only democratic space available and we need
to look beyond it to look for democratic possibilities.
Questions
1. The general impression I got was civil society
means NGOs which in turn means funding. There
have been studies on NGOs, foreign aid, changing
nature of foreign aid. There is an impression
that foreign aid has been increasing all the time
but it hasn’t. There was an increase up
to 1989 but after that there was a decrease. There
has been no systematic study in this area. A lot
of funding has been going to NGOs but we don’t
have accounting. The overall funding that has
gone to the NGO sector is less than 10 per cent
of what has gone to the state. In this context
we need to define what we mean by the state. My
question is, what do you mean by state and what
do you make of the studies on civil society, NGOs
and foreign aid in Nepal?
2. Can you please throw light on NGOs in contributing
to the erosion of democratic space as well as
legitimacy of state?
3. I often think there is an over-emphasis on
civil society as a collective mode of participation
in the Nepali context to the exclusion of looking
at individual aspirations or political consciousness.
Could you please comment on that and how we might
actually go to the grassroots level to include
some of the existing forms of political participation.
There are such traditions in many communities.
How can these be integrated in the national level?
4. My question relates to civic groups being
contested even at the lowest level. Why should
that be a problem? All groups are contested at
the small levels. Groups fighting for similar
aims erode each other’s confidence and steal
each others ideas. Academics do it, politicians
do it. So why should civic groups be singled out?
5. Is there a possibility that we could conceive
of political parties as another form or manifestation
of civil society?
Answers
1. It is not my concern how much money these NGOs
get or the state gets. What I am saying is that
in the rhetoric of building civil society, opening
the sphere of democracy and discussion, the money
is not helping do that. This does not have the
emancipatory democratic potential that it claims
to have and we need to interrogate it more deeply.
Civil society is not only equal to NGOs, it is
more than that.
2. There are two ways of looking at the second
question. One, the non-liberal idea of civil society.
For me, civil society is a bourgeois society.
It’s inherently exclusionary. Other forms
of political participation seems to me so much
more important in a country like Nepal where there
is (a) no clear distinction between society and
state anyway. So where does civil society fit
anyway and (b) whether democratic potentials can
be found within this very limited civil society
which is bourgeois. The second answer is it encourages
in Nepal some NGOs that have a global standing
and cannot be criticised. This is because of funding.
For example one NGO turned down a 50,000 sterling
grant because they are uncomfortable working with
an INGO which had earlier criticised it of unethical
practices. Will we get to that stage where NGOs
are independent of donors? They are already independent
of the state and the people. Where will this lead
to in terms of democratic political sphere?
3. If ethnographic findings could be integrated
we may be able to get away with this obsession
with civil society and the key is to get blinkers
off civil society first.
4. Political space and civil society building
means certain networks are necessary for civil
society. Network includes stabilisation of rights,
includes certain ideas of freedom of association,
freedom of speech and freedom of media. All of
this encompass what democratic sphere should be
and is based on a normative ideal. Because of
this normative ideal, claims of civil society
implicitly ethical – and therefore stand
on a higher moral ground than other ‘normal
practices.’
5. This is just an issue of definition. In my
definition – and a lot of political theory,
political parties are not part of civil society.
They are part of political society. But that is
because I come from a certain orientation. It’s
a definition thing.
* * *
Dipak Gyawali/Space for ethical voice
I have just returned from being a guest at the
annual meeting of one of the first rural electrification
cooperative in Nepal, which encompasses 19 VDCs
of south Lalitpur. To me, this particular group
of people symbolises the problem of inclusion
or exclusion in Nepal. These 19 VDCs of south
Lalitpur have been excluded from electricity for
the last 92 years although its in their midst
that electricity was generated in Pharping for
the first time in Nepal in 1911. They set up a
cooperative a couple of years back to rectify
this anomaly. To me, when we talk about exclusion,
this case in as poignant and difficult a case
as any—this is exclusion from development.
Political exclusion is mainly a problem of the
past. The Ranas and the Panchayat were political
exclusionists in their own way; the Ranas excluded
non-Ranas from the decision-making Bhardari core
while the Panchayat prevented anyone not subscribing
to its ‘partylessness’ ethos. But,
paradoxically, post-1990 Nepal has been politically
inclusive in letter if not in spirit of the law.
I have been told that in ethnic terms in the Panchayat
period representation in the civil service was
much better than has been in the 12 years of democracy.
The year 1990 was expected to be a watershed,
a year of hope that all would be included. Unfortunately,
inclusion was only for the party in power. There
was a tremendous failure of political groups to
see beyond their narrow party boundaries, a failure
to see the distinction between citizen, state
and custodianship.
What were the points of exclusion? With a reductionist
approach to the problem, we might solve bits and
pieces here and there. But the type of exclusion
I am trying to look at is of a different kind.
Let me list some of them. One, which has got to
do with the Maoist problem, is the exclusion of
the small parties built within the constitution.
It is the infamous Article 113 of the constitution.
It is debatable whether such a provision is needed
at all or not. With hindsight, it is seen as an
attempt by the so-called large parties to make
sure no challenge arose and the growth of small
parties was stymied. It is well known when the
Samyukta Jan Morcha split, Baburam Bhattarai’s
faction went to court to get it recognised as
a national party but it could not. When it was
not, it was provided with a legitimacy to go to
the jungles, though this was not the only reason.
Two, the exclusion in the constitution of the
units of local self-governance, something that
was there even in the Panchayat constitution.
The best example of the fusion of these two, the
exclusion of small parties and local units of
governance, was seen in the very first parliament
with its attitude towards the Rolpa DDC, which
was controlled by Jan Morcha and which was not
tolerated by the large parties. Much of the police
action, non-political activities of the large
parties in squashing this DDC and the treatment
meted out to its chairman and others also legitimised
the movement of the Maoists to say that they moved
away from the constitution and the parliamentary
system that they were part of. Three, the other
serious exclusion was the exclusion in public
positions. Appointments were not on merit but
on party affiliation. Four, one of the most serious
forms of exclusion was the exclusion of development
with which I have to deal almost every day as
the king’s minister. Three-fourths of the
applications and petitions I receive deal with
very mundane development issues. This comes across
party lines. They talk about their irrigation
scheme being left out because the minister or
the MP happened to be of a different party. Rural
electrification transmission lines are some of
the worst examples in this regard where transmission
lines are pulled in a different direction to exclude
villages which probably did not vote for the party
in power. Electric poles are dumped in villages
during elections but never erected, and rough
estimates of this type of blocked assets runs
into billions. This kind of inclusion/exclusion
at the village level has led to alienation. If
beneficiaries have been excluded in a structure
that claims to be democratic then there are going
to be a lot of problems.
The lack of development has fed some of the
protests and insurgency movements. I believe that
ultimately free and fair competitive elections
at various levels would solve the problem. However,
in the discourse you hear today there is a loud
silence about elections from those who have to
go to the people for elections to legitimate themselves.
The mandate would come only when MPs have been
elected in a manner that is free and fair. In
the last parliament, in the early days, sessions
were stalled, chairs were broken because parties
were accusing each other of having rigged the
elections. A committee was formed with the prime
minister and the speaker that ended the impasse,
but the ultimate message that came thorough was:
‘We all rigged the elections so let’s
shut up and go on.’ That high-level committee
produced no report nor did it punish any of those
rigging the elections. Well, it turned out that
you could not go on with business as usual as
the subsequent impasse with the parliament did
show. Parties are not clamoring for elections.
Armed Maoists and their violence is only part
of the excuse. I have been travelling the districts
and the most disturbing things that I see is that
while violence is a problem, it is not the only
problem. The bigger problem is the political vacuum
one sees in the districts, a vacuum born our of
mal-development, a vacuum that came from the leadership
at the national and local level getting delegitimised.
To the credit of the Maoists, it might be said
that though their methods of violence were wrong
that, they saw the emerging vacuum and stepped
into it almost effortlessly. But the last 12 years
also show that elections alone are not enough
for democracy and inclusion. Injustice of all
forms, not only of the state but also of the market,
need to be critiqued by our civil society. Of
the three legs of our society—market, state
and civil society—unfortunately the third
that should be the social auditor is the weakest
leg today.
Questions
1. What is your view of federalism that has been
much discussed in these two days?
2. There is a lot of talk of the failure of
the political parties. I wonder isn’t it
the failure of the development ideology not the
failure of development? Isn’t it the success
of technocratic development that is the problem
which did not allow the parties to think beyond
the discourse of development?
3. Is your whole argument to justify the present
state of affairs? The conclusion of your critique
seems to be, why don’t the political parties
go for elections now? Are you trying to imply
that the political parties are responsible for
the present state of affairs?
4. I get the impression that this development
exclusion began only after 1990. I do see the
left extremism much before that. Is it a culmination
of a certain thing or beginning starting with
the failure of the political parties? The land/peasant
movement in some of these areas is pretty old
and none of these areas were included in development
in spite of the fact that the Panchayat system
claimed to go to smaller nooks and corner of the
country than political parties ever claim to be.
Answers
1. On federalism, Nepal is perhaps too small a
unit for federalism . A better decentralisation,
a better devolution of power to municipalities
and district governments and villages also would
probably take care of many of the grievances provided
they were done properly. That’s my position.
On what to do about the current dialogue with
the Maoists, and parties on what to do with the
current constitution (do we take it as it is,
do we reform it, if so how, or do we do scrap
it and go for a constituent assembly), I am a
gradualist. We have experimented with constitutions
too often from BS 2004 and perhaps the current
one has enough scope provided we get it reformed,
getting rid of some of the defects. Federalism
is a new ball game and I think that before we
arrive there or, if we arrive there at all, in
the interim too many things will have gone haywire.
2. The question on development ideology failure,
I think that’s what’s happened. Political
parties have not come up with development ideologies
that are different. However, mass aspiration and
information revolution have meant that expectations
are higher and that delivery should have been
much faster. When delivery regressed, dissident
groups could easily step into the vacuum and justify
themselves on the grounds of critique. There is
opposition to a particular project not so much
because of ideology but because of all sorts of
reasons, including unacceptable built-in inequities.
3. The present state of affairs came about because
of the parties, and ‘justifying’ it
is hardly the thing to do. Had they got their
act together, this would not have happened. The
only way to solve that is to agree upon a minimum
of reform programme and move forward with elections.
But the parties which should be eager to go to
the people fear to do so mainly because their
loss of face (from corruption) at the grassroots.
4. Development exclusion started earlier, but
after 1990, the difference was that the failure
allowed the Maoists to step in. When I go to the
districts, I have been told that people got elected
and never came back to see the project. The panchas
were more astute, they did go back to their constituencies.
It is hardly excusable that those who got elected
did not go back to their constituencies in four
or five years.
* * *
Hari Roka/Towards a politics of inclusion:
Redefining parties for democratisation in Nepal
There hasn’t been a national integration
of our country. Our country has not grown as a
nation-state. That is my conclusion. Political
parties began in Nepal in the 1930s. When the
Ranas allowed land to be bought and sold in 1921,
the small feudals rose against the big feudals.
In the so-called revolution of 1950-51, the small
feudals rose against the big feudals. In other
words, the capitalists rose against the feudals
and the Nepali political parties emerged. So we
were not the deciding factor. There are many issues
like regionalism, ethnicity being raised. We are
not the ones who decide who rules over us or what
is good for the country.
After 1951 parties were split and the institutional
development of parties could not happen as much
as it should have by 1960. After the ban on parties
the political ideology was based on three words—service
to the country, building the country and development
of the country. After the parties were banned,
they could not go to the villages. They stayed
in towns, or were in exile or in jails. They could
not interact with the people.
In the second phase—up to 1990—the
Nepali Congress had an organisation only in 20
districts. The splinter communists groups were
organised in 58 districts altogether. People like
me from the lower middle class or the petit bourgeois
class who had come from the village to the city
to study got involved in the movement. The middle
and lower-middle class people from the towns and
cities were involved in the movement. The movement
coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and East Europe. Two things happened at once.
We began to think that we could not decide for
ourselves how to take the country forward and
secondly political parties’ agenda was the
only democratic and political expression. But
even they could not be aware of the people’s
aspirations as they could not interact with the
people in the past 30 years or more. The Nepali
Congress had embraced democratic socialism as
their ideology in 1955 but with the collapse of
the Soviet Union and East Europe they were in
a dilemma about continuing to embrace this ideology.
So while they retained democracy, they removed
socialism from their agenda. For the communists,
the Soviet Union had collapsed. If they did not
embrace communism, they’d have no identity.
So they embraced communism. Therefore there could
be no discourse in democracy.
In the past 12 years, we have heard that the
political parties are liars and are corrupt. They
are to blame for the malaise. But there are those
that are legally as well as illegally corrupted.
Examples of legal corruption are raising the palace
budget from Rs 110 million to Rs 600 million;
donors giving money to private companies but the
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