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Summary of paper presentations made
at the conference
The Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali
Democracy
organised by
Social Science Baha
24-26 April, 2003
Thursday, 24 April
Morning, Gauri Hall
Session: Social, cultural and economic
exclusion I
Chair: Chaitanya Mishra,
Presenters: Dilli R Dahal,
Jagannath Adhikari
Gopal Guru
* * *
Dilli R. Dahal/Hindu nationalism and
untouchable reform: The status of Dalits in Nepali
society
In Nepal, the king is a symbol of the Hindu
state, and by and large, the people of Nepal identify
with Hindu notions of morality. Inasmuch as they
belong to the Nepali state and subscribe to the
social mores of Nepali society, dalits are a part
of a larger Hindu national identity. Dilli Ram
Dahal spoke about the Hindu enculturation of dalits
of Nepal and the tensions that arise in dalit
movements thereof.
In the second half of the 20th century, there
was a deliberate move by dalits and janjatis towards
seeking inclusion rather than exclusion. Consequently,
untouchability was abolished in Nepal in 1962-63.
Yet, even today, dalits are largely treated as
untouchables. Simultaneously, however, despite
large scale NGO and INGO interventions, dalits
accept their status as untouchables and thereby
reinforce their untouchability.
As the dalit movement gained pace, certain contradictions
with daily practice came to the fore. Thus, while
janjati groups have excluded themselves from the
Hindu fold, they too continue to treat dalits
as untouchables. On the ground, madhesis, janjatis
and dalits have been reduced to mere political
labels even though, in practice, dalits are still
untouchables, who continue to languish at the
bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy in spite of
enabling legislation.
The reasons for this are many, but the basic
flaw in analyses of dalit issues is that they
concentrate on the discourse of rights and the
fact of untouchability at the cost of the economic
dimension, which is the sustaining power behind
caste hierarchies. Dalits today continue to be
the poorest section of society, deprived of the
agency that comes from ownership of or access
to resources. In such a situation, it is inevitable
that they cannot survive outside established structures
of caste patronage, and so they too have an interest
in its continuation.
Because dalits have varying degrees of access
to economic resources, depending on their geographic
location and urban/rural situation, the community
is not monolithic. Instead, it is hierarchically
structured, with hill dalits, Newar dalits and
tarai dalits occupying different rungs on the
social ladder. Hill dalit blacksmiths rank at
the top of the dalit hierarchy. In a place such
as Kathmandu Valley, which is more cosmopolitan
than the rest of Nepal, there is some scope for
social mobility. Thus, the numerically strong
kasais in the valley have been able to take on
the surname of Sai, which is traditionally a Thakuri
surname.
At present, going by the human development indicators,
dalits are the most deprived group in Nepal. Even
though data vary, it is evident that they have
a very high fertility rate, and large households.
Levels of literacy are lower than the national
average, and among dalits, the literacy rate for
tarai dalit women, at 11 per cent, is the lowest.
Landlessness is the norm, with very few exceptions,
but it is particularly true for tarai dalits.
Dalits also score very low in terms of health
and nutrition, with the average life expectancy
and the below-five mortality rate both below national
averages.
Not surprisingly, dalits have low political
participation. In the 1991 parliament, there was
only one elected dalit. Now, however, political
parties and the palace nominate dalits to parliament.
Currently, there are four dalits in the upper
house. At the local level, representation continues
to be poor, with not even one of the village development
committee chairmen in the areas surveyed by Dahal
being dalit.
The issue is not whether people accept water
from a dalit or not, which is what the untouchable-centricity
of the present discourse casts it as, but whether
dalits can make the higher castes validate an
elevated position in the hierarchy for them. However,
dalits accept their subordinate status, are exclusionary
in their own practices and, at the same time,
continue to protest against untouchability.
Criticising the NGO-INGO positive action ‘schemes’,
Dahal said that the rights-based approach will
work in the long term by enhancing social and
political awareness, but is ineffective at the
advocacy level. The livelihood programmes try
to tackle the economic backwardness but are, in
effect, dependent capitalism. By pursuing an exclusivist
programme, dalit NGOs and Kathmandu dalits further
the caste system, and by and large, dalits continue
to be excluded in spite of being included at the
policy level. Democracy has enabled dalits to
make some limited gains but the system must be
instrumental in improving their status on the
ground.
* * *
Jagannath Adhikari/Exclusion and access
to economic opportunities: Implications for political
participation and conflicts
There was a marked change in the amount of political
space available after the 1990 democracy movement.
In the decade since, this space came to be occupied
by the richer groups. In Pokhara, where Jagannath
Adhikhari based his research, the richer group
is that of Gurungs, who are recent settlers. Adhikari
described the inter-linkages between economic
well-being, ethnicity and the electoral process,
as studied at the micro-level in Pokhara.
The richer groups, by virtue of enjoying certain
social and economic rights, are able to better
access and exercise their political rights. Figures
indicate that political participation at the national
level is more representative in democracy than
it was under Panchayat rule. Adhikari’s
concern is with the municipal level, and the impact
of democracy and economic wherewithal on local-level
political participation. The question Adhikari
investigated was whether political participation
at the municipal level is instrumental in reducing
poverty, using data from local-level elections
for analysis.
In Pokhara, which has grown more prosperous
in the last decade (though the Maoist conflict
has crippled its tourism-dependent local economy
now), Adhikari’s research shows that the
marginalised sections of society, such as dalits
and others, are progressively becoming poorer.
Presenting comparative data for dalits and others
(squatters, etc), Gurungs, Newars, Chhetris, Bahuns
and others, Adhikari formed a grid where political
participation, economic well-being and ethnicity
overlapped. He also presented disaggregated data
for dalit participation and voting patterns vis-à-vis
the political parties.
Adhikari found that at the local level, the
1998 local elections showed that rather than the
ethnicity/ideology dichotomy, economic and social
factors were more important in influencing political
choices. Thus, Gurung candidates, even though
they represent a minority, almost consistently
polled higher votes than caste candidates. Ethnicity
is important because it interfaces with economic
well-being. Adhikari also found that women do
not attract votes.
The impact of such marginalisation is felt at
both the personal and the societal level, and
this has tended to feed the impetus for violent
politics as manifested most obviously in the Maoist
movement. In the absence of state-supported mechanisms
of economic advancement, dalits will continue
to languish outside the pale of democratic processes.
The high level of Gurung political mobilisation
in Pokhara, and ethnic mobilisation more generally,
is linked with their greater economic capacity.
Taking its cue from this, the state should support
the economic empowerment of dalits in order to
facilitate their political empowerment.
* * *
Gopal Guru/Spectre of exclusion
Gopal Guru, from the University of Delhi, made
a connection between Nepal and India by concentrating
on certain conceptual issues so as to overcome
the difficulty of unfamiliar specificities.
The language of exclusion/inclusion has come
to be used globally since the advent of neo-liberalism.
He said that while to speak of dalit exclusion
in India is seen as ironic, the inclusion of dalits
is still largely only symbolic; thus, dalits have
been included in the spheres that are denigrated
by the social elites in India – sanitation,
tanneries, presidential office, and so on. Guru
made the point that the quality of inclusion is
more important than symbolic inclusion.
Using the dichotomous method of argumentation
to discuss exclusion and inclusion, Guru elucidated
on the terms and concepts used to explain the
dalit situation.
a) Egoistic/altruistic exclusion: The argument
for egoistic exclusion is driven by modernist
confidence, which stipulates that there is no
requirement of ‘others’, or that the
brute majority does not need others. This rationale,
which translates into ‘I do not want your
votes’ is a way of imposing exclusion on
the other. It builds on the fact that the elites
make up only 20 per cent of the population. As
opposed to egoistic exclusion, altruistic exclusion
is a desirable exclusion and exercised for the
common good. That said, the ghettoisation of dalits
cannot be justifiably validated on moral grounds
as it violates civilisational principles. Guru
said that exclusion, as a dalit strategy, should
not become entrenched in a long-term vision of
the future.
b) Active/passive exclusion: When a dominant
person/group imposes exclusion, it is active exclusion;
active exclusion flows from the top to the bottom
of the hierarchy. This is often simultaneous with
hegemonic inclusion, that is including a token
representative and permanently excluding the group.
This ensures the stability of the dominant person
or group’s position and forecloses protests
from the subordinates. Passive exclusion, however,
is self-imposed. Taking on an unrepresentative
name, for example, because of a fear of social
linkages and prospective humiliation is a form
of such dignified isolation.
c) Sociological/cosmological exclusion: Wherever
Hinduism goes, it carries with it an ideology
of purity and pollution; hence the category ‘dalit
diaspora’. For exclusion, it is the body
and not the mind which is important and to be
excluded. This is sociological exclusion. Cosmological
exclusion, practised largely against women and
dalits, relies on time and space. Therefore, there
are rules against dalits coming outdoors in the
morning and evening when the chances of one of
the higher castes being ‘violated’
by the elongated shadows are highest. This is
now practised only in a mild form. Instead, in
these globalised times, dalits and the poor are
excluded from the ‘prime time’ in
economic spaces, such as at the vegetable market
where dalits have access only to leftover produce.
Dalits are also excluded from certain spaces.
That dalit elites cannot find accommodation in
a good housing society even when they meet the
economic criteria perpetuates the ghettoisation
of dalits.
Social exclusion is the root of all exclusion.
Dalits are not given the opportunity to come out
of their exclusion. Thus, the scavenger carries
the burden of her or his task every minute of
her or his life even while not at work, as does
her or his child.
In a democratic set-up, dalits face a tension
when they choose to exclude themselves. Despite
the fact that they are participating more widely
in electoral processes and have achieved the height
of exclusion now, the depth of exclusion remains
questionable. Currently, dalit exclusion has no
depth, and it will not unless the everyday becomes
more important for democracy. Only if that happens,
and the exercise of democracy becomes less ‘episodic’,
will inclusion become meaningful. A deliberative
democracy – argument and talking –
is necessarily exclusionary. Those who are not
equipped with the skills of articulation, for
instance, are left out.
Outlining the resistance to exclusion, Guru
described three strategies. The stoic argument,
that the dalit sometimes uses to argue for exclusion,
relies on metaphors such as the sun. Thus, as
the sun is untouchable, so is the dalit. To have
any impact, this metaphor must be accepted by
the ‘other’, who is egoistic and recalcitrant.
There is also the pragmatist approach that comes
from an awareness of capacity. So, dalits will
demand positions in one ministry or two, which
they are confident of getting. (Example: the social
welfare department in Maharashtra is always headed
by a dalit, and this is an instance of state ghettoisation.)
Asking for a privileged, dignified inclusion,
even if it is partial, is strategic inclusion.
Dalits, however, continue to find it difficult
to enter civil society. Anarchic inclusion, which
is the complete inclusion of all, should be the
eventual outcome of democracy.
* * *
Questions and comments
Chaitanya Mishra, in his capacity as the moderator,
threw the interactive sessions open with two questions:
a) is the language of inclusion/exclusion the
most appropriate, or are constructions that deploy
words such as oppression and exploitation more
precise descriptions of dalit conditions; and
b) keeping in mind Nepal’s realities, how
can social structures be dismantled, what should
the agenda of transformation be, and how can the
oppression of dalits be brought centre-stage in
the present context?
The discussion grappled with both the prescriptive
ramifications of what had been presented, as well
as conceptual questions. Jagannath Adhikari was
asked to identify the social, political and economic
linkages that influence voters. He was also asked
whether economic and ethnic factors are equally
important in influencing electoral participation;
for example, would a dalit elite receive the same
number of votes as a Gurung? One observation was
that the Gurung-dalit relationship varies from
site to site. In Pokhara today, dalits enter Gurung
homes, which they still cannot do in the village.
Answering a question on the electoral dynamic
in Pokhara, Adhikari said that in Pokhara, Gurungs
mostly belong to the upper classes, but there
are poor Gurungs, among the squatters, for instance.
As a group though, the Gurungs are probably better
organised because of their economic well-being.
At the conceptual level, the question was posed
that if democracy is a set of relations among
individuals within social institutions that are
supposed to be just and inclusive, but instead
serves an enduring dynamic of patron-client relations,
can political, social and cultural relations serve
democracy?
Discussing Guru’s statement that social
exclusion is the source of all exclusion, a participant
said that in Nepal, the basic problem seems to
be at the economic level. In the debate that followed,
it was said that the focus in Nepal is on economic
exclusion because the development discourse finds
it easier to provide economic empowerment than
social or political empowerment, since social
and political exclusions are far more entrenched.
David Gellner asked Guru whether he was pessimistic
about positive representation (positive discrimination
along the quota system) since his paper reflected
a less than ideal situation in India, where it
has been enforced. In Nepal, all the political
parties seem to be favour such a system of inclusion.
Clarifying his position on the subject of positive
action, Guru said he acknowledged the role of
the Indian democracy in bringing dalits to their
present levels of liberation. However, it was
important to take stock of and critique the present
situation.
There was some scepticism about the effectiveness
of the advocacy approach, and whether it would
be effective in breaking social barriers. Practitioners
of the advocacy approach have neglected to recognise
the fundamental characteristic of the Nepali state
– as a Hindu democracy, the state can only
be inclusive up to a degree. Advocacy should be
in accordance with this reality for it to yield
ideological and material concessions.
Dahal concurred with this point and added a
further complicating dimension to NGO advocacy
among dalits. With the NGOs laying stress on the
rights-based approach, old patron-client relationships
that dalits depend on for their survival have
started breaking down. At the same time, the benefits
of economic empowerment have not been uniform
for all dalits even though some groups are economically
liberated. Thus, some dalits are losing out on
traditional modes of dependence and survival without
having new options to fall back on.
Adhikari added that today conditions have changed
for dalits, and they have the option of migrating
overseas (particularly to the Gulf region) to
earn a livelihood. With economic gains, there
have been political and social gains as well.
Economic independence affects social changes,
as dalits now stand up to the Gurungs, and this
confidence enables articulation at the political
level. Political participation is an important
factor in the emancipation of dalits, but it is
not the most important.
Thursday, 24 April
Morning, Shankar Hall
Session: Theoretical Perspectives I
Chair: Lok Raj Baral,
Presenters: John Whelpton
Tom Carothers
Neera Chandhoke
* * *
John Whelpton/Nepalese democracy and
its discontents
This paper examined the practice of democratic
politics in Nepal. Whelpton said that broadly,
there are three democratic models in the world
today:
1. Actual democracy, competition between political
parties and meaningful conflict of interests within
a participatory framework.
2. Participatory democracy, the taking of joint
decisions on issues that directly affect people’s
lives. This is a model which receives support
from the radical left, though in practice it only
works at a local level.
3. Literal democracy, rule by the people, people
power. The problem with this model is that ‘the
people’ do not have singular interests,
barring exceptional historical moments like the
1990 People’s Movement. Literal democracy
is essentially an incoherent theory, through it
has powerful rhetorical elements. This system
can easily transition into totalitarianism, and
in practice is often favoured by the extreme left
through a single-party system of governance.
Since 1990, Nepal has experienced a very imperfect
version of actual democracy. The primary factors
limiting the system’s effectiveness have
been intimidation and criminality. In one sense,
the Maoists are a reaction against this system,
against its failures; in another, they are merely
a logical extension of its practice. As for the
public, people strive to put themselves in line
with what they perceive to be the most powerful
faction, which undermines the effectiveness of
competitive democracy.
Though the system clearly has its faults, there
have also been some successes. Whelpton argued
that the present conference is an example of discussion
and dissent, and Nepal enjoys a relatively free
press and, in general, people are able to voice
anti-establishment views. The practice of politics
also allows some space for challenging power through
democratic means; in the 1999 elections, despite
a Congress government in power, the left parties
won a larger share of the vote. In Nepal, parties
in power cannot ensure that they always win elections,
which means that authority can be challenged through
non-violent confrontation. In this respect, Nepal
is in a better position than, say, Iraq or North
Korea.
In examining the institutional weaknesses of
the system, the main problem is not the constitution
or the legal framework. Rather, it is that actors
in the system do not abide by the existing rules.
If followed, the country’s laws could do
much to improve the current situation. That Nepal
has a crown price believed to be guilty of drunk-driving
homicide does not inspire confidence in the rule
of law.
In any society there exist instruments of coercion
which are necessary for law and order, though
they should be exercised to a minimal extent.
In practice, there is often a trade-off in the
state’s use of force, for example, putting
down a militant rebellion but failing to do so
within the legal framework. Correcting this might
require bringing the armed forces under the unambiguous
control of the elected government, or, as Dipak
Gyawali has suggested, drawing the police force
from local areas and making it locally accountable.
In addition to security issues, Nepal also needs
to face the patronage problem. Perceptions of
what can be gained from the system should not
be the people’s driving motivation. One
example of this problem is the development funds
personally distributed by individual MPs. These
‘pots of gold’, now totalling Rs 1
million each, are dispersed at legislators’
discretion. A better system would draw on local
recommendations. In practice, this could rely
on a lottery system, which might also be useful
in civil service appointments.
The third key issue is decentralisation. While
avoiding specific recommendations, consider alcohol
prohibition, language choice and local ‘user
groups’. The Maoists have made the first
of these an issue, and it could be an important
topic for local communities to decide. On language
choice, the primary difficulty is in determining
at what level decentralisation is to occur. For
public ownership, the ‘user groups’
should be tied to geography, not to ethnicity,
which often has the effect of reinforcing ethnic
assumptions.
Whelpton’s view was that the challenge
is to find a way of keeping people within the
system and creating a politics of inclusion. Different
actors have different responsibilities; parties
should agree on a minimum programme, and the king
could play an appropriate role, such as leading
an anti-untouchability campaign. There are also
important roles for NGOs and people not directly
involved with politics (non-politicians and -activists),
that is, people driven by an interest in a defined
area.
* * *
Tom Carothers/The end of the transition
paradigm
Carothers began with the caveat that his paper
draws not on the expertise of a Nepal specialist,
but on a comparative approach to democratisation
in different parts of the world to contextualise
Nepal’s experience within other global developments.
He drew attention to the idea of ‘transition
democracy’. In the last two decades, a remarkable
wave of political developments has occurred, with
democracies overturning dictatorships in many
places. As a consequence, a framework emphasising
the transition to democracy emerged to help explain
these changes. But, as transitions cannot go on
indefinitely, the phase of transition democracy
has probably ended in many places. There is now
a need to develop new paradigms to explain political
trends.
The concept of ‘transition to democracy’
was founded on five assumptions:
1. Any country moving away from authoritarianism
is moving towards democracy.
1.2. Democratisation is a natural process proceeding
in stages. It is possible to place a country on
a continuum of democratic development.
1.3. Elections are important in two ways: for
forming a foundation of political choice and for
serving as a basis for continuing reform that
produces responsible and responsive politicians.
1.4. Economic and political development do not
necessarily depend on each other. Democracy does
not require certain economic pre-conditions.
1.5. Building a democracy and a more effective
state are complimentary processes.
These assumptions have been undermined by experiences
in the last few years. Today, of the approximately
100 countries once labelled ‘transition
democracies’, only 10-20 are moving towards
consolidated democracy. For the most part, these
countries are found in eastern Europe, Latin America
and East Asia. In many parts of the world, countries
have ended up in a grey zone between democracy
and authoritarianism. People in these countries
often say similar things: ‘Politicians in
this country don’t care about the common
people’, ‘We had such high expectations,
but we haven’t seen any rewards’,
‘Corruption is a massive problem’,
‘We’re not really interested in ideology’,
‘The parties don’t stand for anything
but themselves’, ‘I’m interested
in competence and honesty’, ‘We’re
very concerned about the influence of the private
sector on the political process’.
The core assumptions of the transition democracy
paradigm are not proving true. For instance,
1) abandonment of authoritarianism can lead to
many different things, not all of which are democratic;
2) nations continue to deal with fundamental problems,
despite talk of stages;
3) good elections can exist with bad politics;
the virtuous cycle does not always work out; and
4) the economic assumptions of democracy have
not proved true—poverty is highly corrosive
for democracy, and an independent civil society
and media are hard to establish in impoverished
societies;
5) democracy-building in the ideal case should
be about distributing power, but in state-building,
it is about assembling power and people often
blame the weakness of the state for failures.
Many of the countries in this ‘grey zone’
are not in a process of change that we understand,
said Carothers. Surveying the world, some countries
(Uzbekistan, Egypt, Malaysia) have fallen into
a dominant power group. A powerful family/clan
controls politics, and while they allow some token
dissent, there is no chance for substantive change.
The other set of countries is mired in feckless
pluralism. No single group controls power, but
there is endemic incompetence among the elite,
in spite of external funding of civil society.
Both of these systems have their relative merits
of stability. In Egypt, for instance, Hosni Mubarak
manipulates public opinion to stay in power and
provide continuity. In the second category, there
is the continuous process of renewal, which can
remain relatively stable for a long time. In the
second group, there are two ways change occurs:
as in Venezuela, where a non-party candidate enjoys
success, or alternatively, with a revolutionary
movement, which has the effect of undermining
the political centre, strengthening both the left
and the right.
In Nepal, people are frustrated with the incompetence
of the political elite, the powerlessness of civil
society, the overwhelming problems, and the failures
of elections to effect change. Nepal is not unique,
though there are some aggravating circumstances
here, including massive poverty, unusual political
fracturing, oppression and a monarchical system.
In conclusion, it is no longer appropriate to
call Nepal a country in transition to democracy,
but instead to place it in some other category.
Nepal is on the edge of something decidedly undemocratic.
* * *
Neera Chandhoke/Living with diversity
Chandhoke began by pointing out one of the ideas
related to democracy: the demand for quotas. In
the political realm, this means that only a Dalit
can represent Dalits, and so on with other groups.
Her presentation focused on the experience of
India to help Nepal approach quotas and other
methods of addressing long-standing inequities.
A conceptual shift takes place when a person
is seen as an individual victim of history to
when a body of people is viewed as a group victimised
by history. Liberals have often been suspicious
of group identities and privileges, in part because
they seem to be the mirror of other advantages.
But liberals in recent decades have shifted their
position.
The second shift that has taken place in the
move from the individual to the group as a holder
of rights is collective culpability and collective
victimhood. No one can argue for exemption as
an individual from these patterns, either in guilt
of victimisation. The idea driving this is we-versus-they:
we, the beneficiaries of history, must pay a price
to those who have suffered. But this is not egalitarianism;
it is humanitarianism. Can humanitarianism assist
democracy? This assumes the transfer of resources
though the underlying forces and structures may
not change. It may just create a new elite among
the disadvantaged who participate with society’s
elite.
Egalitarianism is not founded on the idea of
‘we owe something to them’, but instead
on the notion that each person in society has
an equal claim to resources. Assertion here is
a matter of rights, not a question of victimhood.
Egalitarianism is a relational concept: the relation
between the worst-off and the best-off. Egalitarianism
is not only about bleeding hearts. It is about
fundamentally re-ordering rights in society. Affirmative
action has been designed at a group level rather
than at an individual level as an attempt to achieve
this.
Chandhoke said that a second problem is that
it is easy for a political elite to entrench its
power by co-opting the leadership of oppressed
groups. This also has the important effect of
preventing fundamental change, such as land reform,
because the new elite has a stake in the existing
system. Third, the politics of reservations has
actually divided politics: everyone is a victim.
Everybody competes in defining themselves as victims,
even Hindus. This serves the elite, because everyone
is competing for victim status. Four, reservations
address inter-group inequality but not intra-group
inequality. Poor Dalits remain poor, even while
better-off Dalits enjoy the benefits of reservations.
Fifth, rather than weaken the state, reservations
empower the state. This occurs through the powers
of patronage and the process of creating and fashioning
group identities.
These measures can be inimical to democracy.
Democracy is about much more than respecting the
identities of citizens, though it is this also.
It is about a common vision and common effort
to move toward certain goals. Chandhoke said it
is necessary to transcend barriers that prevent
engagement. Without a common set of values, the
common space suffers. Given the proliferation
of group identities, democrats spend most of their
time sorting out competing claims. She asked if
people subscribe to anything more than a formal
concept of democracy? That is to say, in the construction
of rights, the difference between positive and
negative freedoms. Radical democracy involves
the search for common goals. Unless some values
are privileged over others, the status quo will
simply be maintained.
* * *
Questions and comments
Discussion opened with Mahendra Lawoti responding
to John Whelpton’s point about the constitution
not being the fundamental political problem in
Nepal. Lawoti argued that while there may have
been some instances of the party in power losing
an election, these are rare, owing to the dynamics
of the country’s parliamentary structure.
Nepal needs governance institutions reflective
of the country’s multiculturalism, which
the current constitutional framework does not
provide. Even though elections may be relatively
free and fair, they fail to represent the interests
of the entire public or ensure accountability
among elected leaders. A better system would have
institutions independent of the executive, making
them more responsive and less corrupt. Whelpton
responded by saying that he did not think that
there were no problems with the current set-up,
only that the primary problems lay outside the
constitution.
Another respondent to Whelpton suggested by
way of computer analogy that Nepal had the ‘hardware’
for democracy but lacked the ‘software’
to make it function effectively. Whelpton noted
that institutional and attitudinal problems are
often interlinked, making it difficult to say
whether the problem was as clear as the analogy
suggests. A third respondent to Whelpton challenged
the presenter on the role of the monarchy, saying
that Nepal’s king had played a role in helping
disadvantaged groups in the country, but that
these efforts were largely symbolic and may have
been motivated by less than altruistic motives.
Whelpton responded by saying that while he was
not aware of these efforts, they may have been
poorly publicised or cynical.
A number of panellists and others in the audience
requested Tom Carothers to expand on his comments
about the end of the transition paradigm. Several
questions challenged the validity of the transition
paradigm in that it places Western democracies
at the end-point even though those societies may
mistreat minorities and/or have governments that
are not responsive to public opinion. Two respondents
to Carothers questioned the utility of comparative
politics, with the first arguing that people may
say similar things about feckless democracy in
many places but that it is difficult to draw conclusions
about statements that do not necessarily reflect
the true attitudes of the public. For instance,
in Nepal people often disparage the political
process but mobilisations and political change
still occur. The second respondent cast doubt
on Carothers’ argument that the transition
paradigm no longer applies to Nepal, as, if one
takes a long view of history, the country is transitioning
from a monarchical system to a democratic one,
but that transition may not be confined to one
decade. Seira Tamang questioned Carothers on the
limitations of American democracy, in particular
its poor representation of African-American interests,
and asked if the transition paradigm might also
apply to advanced democracies.
Carothers largely agreed with the points about
problems inherent in the transition paradigm,
and with Tamang’s point about applying the
assumptions of the transition paradigm to Western
democracies. He pointed out that a single party
dominates Japanese politics and that many Western
democracies suffer from voter disinterest or feckless
party politics. But the model is somewhat valid
in that the problems in Western democracies do
not lead to a breakdown of the system as often
happens in recently democratised countries. He
responded to the criticisms of comparative politics
by agreeing that national situations will vary,
but that the experience of one country may shed
light on the conditions in another. By way of
example he discussed El Salvador, were a violent
Marxist movement eventually joined mainstream
politics. But, he pointed out, insurgencies usually
end with either a clear victory by one side or
with mutual exhaustion of the participants. Nepal
is not approaching the former and probably not
the latter.
Questions for Neera Chandhoke focused on how
her observations about reservations in India apply
to Nepal’s situation. One person pointed
out that Dalits constitute 13 per cent of Nepal’s
population, but they are effectively without political
representation. As such, he said, it appears that
quotas are necessary for guaranteeing any degree
of political representation for historically oppressed
groups. Other questions for Chandhoke asked her
to offer specific recommendations for Nepal and
to elaborate on her comments about group-based
rights.
Chandhoke responded to the first question by
noting that she is not a Brahmin, and that her
argument about the limited utility of quotas arises
from an honest engagement with public policy in
India. She noted that research from the 1960s
had shown the reservations help selected groups
in the public sphere but failed to advance them
in the private sector. That Dalits face the same
problems they did decades ago indicates that India’s
reliance on a quota system has failed to advance
the group’s interests. Quotas are one component
of social justice, not a substitute for it. In
India, land reform has been ignored, and that
is necessary for meaningful change. In response
to the question about group-based rights, Chandhoke
argued that every public policy must be justified
normatively from time to time, but that quotas
have not gone through this process. She stated
that a comprehensive evaluation of the entire
system was necessary, and that, in the future,
a shared vision of society should help guide policy
decisions. The ideal should be egalitarian democracy,
not mere redistribution of resources from time
to time.
The chair, Lok Raj Baral, closed the discussion
by noting that Nepal is witnessing a period of
rapid and exciting change, and that at least democracy
had allowed people to debate and discuss competing
ideas about governance. The challenge, he argued,
was in democratising democracy and bringing into
the system those left out in the current dispensation.
Thursday, 24 April
Afternoon, Gauri Hall
Session: Structures and visions I
Chair: Pratyoush Onta
Presenters: Walter Kaelin
Sudhindra Sharma
Lynn Bennett
* * *
Walter Kaelin/Inclusive constitutional
law
Walter Kaelin presented a framework of inclusive
constitutional law within which the Nepali constitution
may be formed. Describing the importance of power
sharing in fragmented societies, he gave the example
of the USSR and Somalia, both of which failed
to manage the issues that arose from imposing
unity by denying diversity. Thus, the synthetic
unity broke down with well-known consequences.
A comparative perspective on constitutions and
democracy has evolved, and two basic types of
democratic political systems have been identified.
One is the majoritarian approach, and the other,
the consensual or associational approach. In the
first case, the winner takes all but only for
a limited period, with the result that over time
diverse interests are accommodated by the state.
The majoritarian system may be appropriate for
relatively homogenous societies, but it fails
in countries such as Nepal, where societies are
fragmented. Consensual or associational democracies
are more likely to allow for power sharing. The
electoral system of proportional representation
at all levels, coupled with decentralisation and
vertical power sharing, facilitates negotiation
and compromise, and no one group is able to monopolise
the idea of the nation-state.
So far, in Nepal, talk of inclusion in constitution
making has not moved beyond a debate on the Maoist
demand for a constituent assembly. Whether the
constitution should come up for debate in parliament
or be entrusted to a constituent assembly is a
secondary procedural question. At present, it
is important to consider the process of constitution-building
and normative questions, such as the nature of
the constitution. As per constitutional theory,
the ideal constitution is a social covenant that
lays out the basic modalities of peaceful conflict
resolution. Nepal, at this stage, is faced with
the question of how to reach a social consensus.
For a constitution to be legitimate, the process
of its making must be deemed legitimate, and must
generally reflect the will of the majority. The
process must be inclusive; however, because there
is often an unmanageable number of groups, the
process turns out to be neither inclusive nor
representative.
Kaelin cited the example of South Africa where
the basic principles of the constitution were
decided after detailed deliberations, following
which a transitory parliament was elected. The
various groups that came to occupy the political
space after apartheid trusted this process.
An inclusive constitution provides for proportional
representation at various levels of governance,
accompanied by inclusiveness in various government
organs and bodies. The example of Switzerland,
which follows a quota system, may be useful for
Nepal. Proportional representation must be complemented
by effective decentralisation.
Kaelin added the caveat that while other countries
may provide clues as to how to build an inclusive
constitution, Nepal must ultimately evolve its
own system out of its particular historic and
situational context.
* * *
Sudhindra Sharma/The dharmashastric
view(s) of Hindu kingship: Implications for the
debate on constitutional monarchy and democracy
in Nepal
Classical debates on religion and kingship that
have taken place in France or the UK are irrelevant
to the Nepali context. The dharmashastras provide
a much better understanding of the Hindu king’s
right to rule and religion, and the Hindu kingship
of Nepal must be examined in the light of these
texts. In his exploratory paper, Sudhindra Sharma
argued that in spite of being a Hindu state, Nepal
has only one Hindu institution, which is the monarchy.
The Hindu identity of the Nepali state may be
reinforced by certain rules, such as the ban on
cow slaughter, the ban on proselytisation, and
the promotion of Hindu festivals, but these are
only symbols. In such a situation, it is possible
to secularise the Nepali state while maintaining
the ‘Hinduness’ of the kingship.
The separation of secular and sacred activities
in a Hindu state is determined by caste. Thus,
Sharma proposed that the Hindu kingdom was better
placed to accommodate secularism than a state
that fuses the secular and sacred spheres. In
India, the functions of the king have been secularised,
while religious functions have been given over
to brahmins; in Nepal, the magico-religious functions
in the Hindu state have been entrusted to the
priests, while the king has assumed the political
functions. The kingship is inherently Hindu in
Nepal, but state secularism and a Hindu king are
not necessarily oppositional to each other. Since
the kingship is the only Hindu institution in
the country, a separation of the king and the
kingdom would easily facilitate an arrangement
whereby the king is Hindu but the kingdom is secular.
The dharmashastras, which also contain theories
of social contract, do not posit any one view
on kingship. They contain varied views on politics,
including the Hobbesian idea of the big devouring
the small, or matsyayana (the big fish consuming
the small fry). However, since the Nepali king
is regarded as an avatar of Vishnu, he falls outside
the pale of the dharmashastras. He is supposed
to be married to the earth, but today, the king
no longer owns all the land in the kingdom. In
practice, therefore, from these examples and many
more, it can be surmised that Nepal is already
a secular kingdom, and to separate the religious
identity of the king from that of the country
is not unimaginable.
* * *
Lynn Bennett/Towards an inclusive society:
The role of state policy and institutional reform
in enabling more effective and equitable agency
among diverse groups in Nepal
Lynn Bennett spoke about diversity, inclusion,
and contesting hierarchy in Nepali democracy,
which today is the site of gender, caste and ethnic
exclusion at the national level. Addressing the
question of social change, she said that empowerment
and inclusion are both important. Empowerment
comes from change at the grassroots level, and
inclusion must be facilitated at the policy and
institutional levels. If one is unaccompanied
by the other, situations arise like that of the
kamaiyas, who are empowered but not included.
In Bennett’s framework, there were three
elements: a) people/actors organised in power
relationships; b) assets and capabilities; and
c) rules of the game or institutions, which are
many and often in conflict with each other.
First, describing the typical relationships
in an unequal society, Bennett suggested the mechanism
through which change can be effected. In any existing
structure, institutions (which are controlled
by the elites) control assets and capabilities.
Providing livelihood empowerment, i.e. access
to assets and capabilities for the poor enables
the formation of a middle class. This must be
accompanied by mobilisation empowerment, or enabling
people to engage, influence and hold accountable
the institutions that affect their lives. There
must also be social inclusion at the policy level,
as it cannot come from people at the grassroots.
Bennett outlined the history of inclusion (or
exclusion) in Nepal. Broadly speaking, Nepal has
had three historical periods. During the Shah-Rana
era, the caste system was used to unify the diverse
groups of Nepal, and a patriarchal ideology and
gender exclusion were dispatched for the control
of women. During the 30-year Panchayat era (1960-1990),
the caste system was abolished but the legal code
was not consistent with the legislation, and citizens’
rights were very limited. Inclusion meant the
assimilation into the Hindu parbatiya mould—which
janjatis, dalits and women were expected to adhere
to. The latest era is of multiparty democracy,
into which the period of the Maoist insurgency
may be subsumed. It is important to ask how far
Nepal has progressed in terms of inclusion during
democracy, and to assess how 40 years of development
aid have affected Nepal’s social structures.
It is important to keep in mind that during this
period, the situation developed such that the
janjatis, dalits and women were ready recruits
for the Maoists when the insurgency arrived. This
is because ethnic, gender and caste disparities
persisted in spite of aid and democracy.
Bennet suggested that the way forward was deep
inclusion, which can only be brought about by
changes from within the power structure. This
entails the granting and guaranteeing of citizens’
rights, institutional accountability, and changes
in values and the code of behaviour. Even within
the present social hierarchy, there is space for
diversity to manifest itself, but it is not being
utilised.
* * *
Questions and comments
Some very specific questions were asked of the
speakers. Since all three presentations had a
prescriptive dimension, many queries dealt with
the potential for realisation in the proposals.
With reference to the proposition that majoritarian
systems work well in relatively homogenous countries,
David Gellner cited the example of Thatcherite
Britain and Scottish nationalism in the UK, where
the Westminster system was evolved. On Sharma’s
thesis, Gellner wondered whether Sharma’s
hope for a move towards secularism would actually
bear the fruit of secularism, given the importance
of symbols, and the real battles that take place
over who owns national symbols. He asked Lynn
Bennett about her reaction to the critique that
donors created the mess that Nepal is currently
in by taking the rhetoric of empowerment to the
grassroots, and then undermining the Nepali state
and channelling funds into NGO activity.
A.C. Sinha reminded the speakers about dissonances
between statements of intention and operative
realities. Reacting to Gellner, he said that donor
funding in Bhutan had been received entirely by
the government, and yet Bhutan is in social chaos
today. He also pointed out the shortcomings of
consensual or coalition politics in India.
There were some observations on Sudhindra Sharma’s
use of terms from the dharmashastras without defining
them, which Sharma defended, clarifying that his
use of dharmashastric terminology was deliberately
fluid, in accordance with the flexibility of interpretation
in the source texts. Sharma was also criticised
for not including Nepali perspectives and interpretations.
He admitted this shortcoming in the paper, conceding
that he had paid less attention to the ground
realities of Nepal and Nepali literature and concentrated
almost wholly on the dharmashastras.
In response to Bennett’s paper, the point
was made that in Nepal, inclusiveness has led
to exclusionism, as a result of which ‘there
is an exclusive group in an inclusive society’.
It was felt that the contested nature of inclusion
had been ignored in the discussions. To this Walter
Kaelin responded that from the perspective of
constitution making, inclusion refers to power
sharing and not to harmony. Conflict and dissent
are important political phenomena, but if always
acted out by the same groups, they betray an almost
ritualised exclusion. While every society has
exclusionary tendencies, exclusion is particularly
severe in developing countries where resource-sharing
and income distribution is inequitable. One observer
said that the difference between marginalisation
in developed and developing countries was not
that it was absent in the first and present in
the second, but that resource-rich first world
governments were much more effective in putting
down dissent.
Protesting the suggestions of affirmative action
through the quota system, one participant ventured
that land reform and other social strategies were
better methods for effecting long-term change,
with fewer chances of engendering conflict. It
was doubted that proportional representation would
work in Nepal, when even under the current system
political parties seldom fulfil their representation
obligations in candidate lists.
Broadly, Kaelin agreed about the lack of legitimacy
of the 1990 constitution, and reasserted that
there was no magic formula for the new constitution
but to establish the basics of conflict resolution.
He emphasised the importance of the process and
the negotiating principles, and said that the
desired outcomes should be basic changes in the
electoral system and multiple autonomies. On the
question of operationalising empowerment, he favoured
the quota system and affirmative action. He said
that the consensus model fails unless it has first
arrived at the key elements of power sharing.
Sudhindra Sharma recommended that in order to
secularise, the Nepali state should do away with
such symbols as the ban on proselytising, and
stop providing resources for houses of worship
and supporting religious education. In this regard
he cited the example of the UK, where the state
is identified with a particular church, but is
yet quite secular. As a case in point, he compared
‘Anglican’ Britain with ‘secular’
India. He also said that the relative numbers
of a particular religious denomination in a country
do not necessitate that the state identify with
a particular religion. For example, relative to
the total population in each country, Nepal has
a smaller Hindu population than India.
Sharma also said that it was not possible to
generalise on monarchies and their abrogation.
In Asia, most monarchs were removed by colonial
powers, and very few by social upheaval.
Commenting on the donors’ inability to
achieve changes, Lynn Bennett said that the donors
were guilty of adopting a go-around-the-government
strategy when they realised that the funds were
not reaching their intended destinations. But,
she said, now there was a consciousness of ‘development
hydrology’, that pushing money down a pipe
did not achieve any real results. Donors have
now pulled the reins on funding, and demand greater
government accountability. She said that the donors
realise the need for structural change.
Answering a question on behavioural change,
Bennett said that behavioural change begins with
a change in the rules, which are accompanied by
incentives to follow the rules. This effects a
change first in peoples’ thinking and then
in their feeling. While this is an opportunist’s
argument, she said that people should have the
chance to change loyalties to a group that better
serves their interests.
No culture espouses exclusion and holds it up
as a virtue—exclusion comes from various
compulsions, such as economic scarcity. There
is a scope for tapping that cultural space for
inclusionism, and making it the fulcrum on which
to leverage change.
Thursday, April 24
Afternoon, Shankar Hall
Session: Theoretical Perspectives II
Chair: Rajendra Pradhan
Presenters: Stephen Mikesell
Saubhagya Shah
* * *
Stephen Mikesell/Unfinished agendas
of the 1990 Movement
Democracy implies enfranchisement, active engagement
and organised confrontation. In Nepal, two struggles
have been termed ‘democratic’: the
People’s Revolution of 1951 and the People’s
Movement of 1990. In both cases, political parties
initiated the action, though the masses later
added their support. In that sense, both were
‘democratic’, although neither really
served the interests of people at large.
Mikesell focused in on the 1990 movement. Though
it had some spontaneous elements, in the end it
proved to be primarily for the benefit of the
parties and of limited use to the people. The
leadership called the campaign from India, and
it started as a one-point demand to lift the ban
on political parties. Political parties were equated
with freedom, which was a false equation, even
for the cadres. The movement deceived people in
its inability to serve their interests. The structural
forces of governance did not change, though some
democratic aspects did emerge out of the movement.
Demands called for an end to rule by inheritance,
and some attempts were made at independent media,
such as Free Nepal Radio in Kirtipur. Had many
of the democratic trends been fostered, true democracy
could have been facilitated. Individuals demobilised
after the success of the one-point programme on
the assumption that the parties would continue
to take the democratic struggle forward from the
top-down.
In certain respects, this demobilisation was
similar to the German Social Democrats’
victory in 1920, in that both led to the disbanding
of armed workers and supporters after initial
victory. In the German case, it led to Hitler’s
rise. In Nepal, party leaders tended to see the
strengthening of their own positions as the strengthening
of their parties and failed to engage the populace
fully. Party leaders had to look for powerful
sponsors (corporate, donor, etc), resulting in
a leadership aligned with the interests of others,
not the people. Moreover, party hierarchies were,
and are, often corrupt.
The 1990 constitution was not written in a democratic
way. Its drafters represented the class/caste
interests of the elite, not the masses, and the
final product had little democratic validity.
If the people had been involved in the process,
there would have been ancillary democratic benefits.
Lawyers tend to see the constitution as something
to be enshrined and worshipped, but without a
democratic process, the constitution does not
mean much.
In the years since, bureaucracy, a tool of social
control, has frequently been the subject of calls
for decentralisation. In Nepal, the bureaucracy
has been an avenue through which multilateral
agencies, corporate interests and various global
bodies pursue their agendas. Today, with a USD
4 billion debt, Nepal effectively has no sovereignty,
and external interests and their partners among
the domestic elite are the real power base.
The successful assertion of people’s interests
necessarily involves conflict with the bureaucracy.
But the monarchy successfully resisted attempts
to decentralise power during the constitution-framing
period. The anchaladhish—the monarchy’s
representatives—maintained the king’s
power base at the local level through a surveillance
system.
A better system would have been representation
by locally elected delegates. The interim government
did not endorse the local government control plan,
and only three members of the government supported
it. If the communities had been involved in the
drafting of the constitution, they would have
gained more power than they eventually did. All
of this undermines the Congress Party’s
claim to being representative of the people—it
sends authority downwards, rather than secure
legitimacy upwards. Only the incompetence of the
anchaladhish prevented their use as more effective
central tools, though the central government has
many methods of undermining democracy at the local
level. The selection of candidates by central
authorities, rather than by local bodies, further
undermined the potential for democratic representation.
Under the Congress-led governments of the 1990s,
the monarchy’s anchaladhish were replaced
with centrally appointed spies of the party, the
chhetrapal, who performed a similar function.
Rather than being revolutionary in outlook,
parties have increasingly represented competition
for clientalism. After political leaders are elected,
they ignore the interests and needs of their constituents.
Clearly, there are better ways to organise politics.
Among other improvements, these include drawing
candidates from local areas, not from party hierarchies,
and increasing the public’s ability to retrieve
unrepresentative leaders. People retain some power
(hence bandhs) but real change requires the body
politic to be politicised, not just rubber-stamping
decisions of the party hierarchy. This also entails
local control over ecology, agriculture, education,
knowledge and economics, rather than centralised
control.
In Bolivia, people mobilised against their own
local government’s sale of water interests
to Bechtel, an American corporation. In China,
where the presenter has been based for the last
five months, local people have resisted ecological
rape. Brazil is a good model, because Brazil is
home to strong populist politics, of mobilising
bottom-up rather than legislating top-down. In
the 1960s, when Brazilian populist politics was
beginning, the government gave into many of the
people’s demands. But after the 1964 CIA-backed
coup, US foreign assistance dominated the country.
Even so, people still resisted street-by-street,
town-by-town. Many town councils require strong
community participation by the leadership to prevent
a professional political class from emerging.
And all of this was done in spite of restrictions,
constitutional and otherwise, from above. The
Brazilian model shows that there are other models
of democratic politics than multi-party democracy,
which has largely failed in Nepal.
* * *
Saubhagya Shah/Nepali dystopia: The
search for an articulating state
Shah’s presentation attempted to engage
with the literature on democracy and the state,
drawing extensively on Britain’s experience.
Today, Nepal is attempting to place itself in
debates that have histories extending back centuries.
Here the focus will be on the philosophical origins
of statehood and their implications for Nepal,
rather than on the ideologically-loaded literature
of Nepal’s last three decades of state evolution.
The failures since 1990 have undermined the
Nepali nation-state in many different ways, calling
into question basic assumptions of the country’s
history and present political structure. Some
have even gone so far as to malign the Nepali
nation-state as an outcome of Gorkha aggression.
This naturally raises further lines of inquiry,
particularly about the legitimacy of a nation-state
formed in such a manner. The mutually constituted
terms of monarchy and state have important implications;
consider Afghanistan and Kashmir, and their recent
histories. In the case of Nepal’s monarchy,
given that it is an outcome of history and has
served an historical function, it should be retained,
with modern reforms appropriate to this country
and society.
A second question concerns structures and actors.
In Nepal, the focus has mostly been on the latter,
but which structures help, and which ones hinder
successful state functioning? In the discourse
of despair, the assumption is that the structures
are fine but the individuals have failed. Most
political models take into account the potential
for incompetent/corrupt individuals, but Nepal
lacks operational measures to prevent corruption
and veniality. For instance, Nepal adopted the
Westminster parliamentary model, despite the unsuitability
of that model to the conditions of this country.
Shah questioned the extent to which the Nepali
state is designed to meet the goals and desires
of the Nepali people. In its present formation,
the state is unable to deliver on its commitments,
even of protecting life and property. In this
light, Nepal’s contemporary situation can
be contexualised within the philosophical debates
on governance in 17th-century England. John Locke
argued for a minimalist state, while conversely,
Thomas Hobbes advocated a strong power to protect
citizens. The Nepali state has failed in basic
responsibilities such as guaranteeing physical
security, not to mention secondary and tertiary
ones. From a Hobbesian perspective, in the absence
of a competent state, essential functions of government
cannot be carried out.
The 1990 constitution erred on two counts: weakening
the king’s authority without taking into
consideration the corresponding weakening of the
Nepali state, and leaving the political set-up
beset with ambiguity and uncertainty. The events
of the last 13 years have clearly demonstrated
the seriousness of these omissions. Plato’s
Republic warns that democracy can easily disintegrate
into tyranny or anarchy, and both appear to be
threatening Nepal. The state is incapable of governing
itself, much less the country.
The framers of the 1990 constitution fundamentally
misread the ways in which the state’s constituent
parts fit together, Shah argued. The resultant
fractured state has been unable to deliver on
its commitments, one obvious example being its
inability to control Maoist violence. Hobbes underlined
the importance of having but one authority in
society with powers of physical coercion. But
Nepal has suffered several insurgencies over the
years, demonstrating that there is no monopoly
on the tools of violence.
In the old days, the state needed only 100 troops
to maintain law and order in the Karnali zone.
In recent years, despite the deployment of thousands
of troops and the efforts of dozens of NGOs, the
area is nearly ungovernable. A fundamental responsibility
of the state is administering the country with
rudimentary competence and safeguarding citizens.
The philosophical foundation of this position
rests with Rousseau, who argued that the state
must be the protector of people’s rights.
Other reforms to the system should include strong
anti-corruption measures, using property as a
basis for gauging wealth, and increasing the power
of the prime minister. Specialists, not politicians,
believed Shah, should be appointed ministers.
This would both help to secure the prime minister’s
political position as the central figure and bring
a degree of expertise to the practice of government
that has been sorely lacking to date.
* * *
Questions and comments
Many respondents to Stephen Mikesell’s presentation
challenged the ability of his local-level political
prescriptions to provide a basis for meaningful
national-level politics. One person commented
Mikesell had failed to discuss the real unfinished
agendas of the 1990 movement, and that his presentation
was concerned with problems of management, not
the larger challenge of governing a nation. Another
person suggested that Mikesell’s system
of community-based local-level governance was
similar to the Panchayat system, and that the
model he was advocating could not facilitate democratic
competition among parties with different policy
programmes. The remarks about national organisation
of politics led into a question about how Mikesell
would respond to the Maoists’ call for a
constituent assembly. Would such a body satisfy
his criteria of democratic engagement with the
populace? On parties, a respondent challenged
Mikesell’s interpretation of the role of
chhetrapals, saying that their emergence was a
somewhat necessary response to the army’s
power at the ground level. Finally, a member of
the audience suggested that the underlying assumption
of Mikesell’s presentation—that democracy
had failed in Nepal—had to be re-evaluated
in the regional context. While Nepal’s experience
with democracy may have been less than successful
in comparison to similar systems in the West,
Nepal should be compared with governments in places
like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Indeed, Nepal’s
linkages to India are so substantial that an evaluation
of Nepali democracy that does not take them into
account will be incomplete.
Mikesell opened his response by noting that
the questions posed by respondents were very challenging.
As to whether he supported the Maoist demand for
a constituent assembly, Mikesell said that he
focused on process and that he was not sure if
a constituent assembly would help Nepal evolve
a better political system. He agreed with the
comment about making regional comparisons, but
disagreed with the criticisms that his presentation
did not provide a national basis for politics.
In particular, he took issue with the Panchayat
comparison, arguing that it was a top-down dispensation
while his is a bottom-up method of organising.
But he did concede that there were aspects of
political organisation the fell outside his field
of study.
Several panellists and audience members criticised
Saubhagya Shah’s argument about the role
of the Nepali monarchy. One noted that in most
places the state originates with a kingship system
and gradually evolves into a democratic model,
but that Shah’s argument goes against this
general trend by reinvesting powers in Nepal’s
monarchy. A second respondent expressed disappointment
with the presentation, saying that it lacked theoretical
or analytical rigour in its over-reliance on technocratic
solutions to Nepal’s governance problems.
He pointed out that in the US, non-elected ministers
of the sort that Shah advocated for Nepal are
tools of corporations. Moreover, many of Nepal’s
governance problems stem from the irresponsible
behaviour of actors, rendering insufficient a
presentation the focuses nearly exclusively on
structure. One other audience member commented
the tension between actors and structures. In
Shah’s defence, a respondent argued that
constitutional monarchy is popular today among
Nepal’s people, and that the kingship institution
is needed in state affairs.
Shah responded by first stating that while his
presentation focused on structures, much attention
had been paid elsewhere to the role of actors
and that he was not implying that it was irrelevant.
He addressed the question about the evolution
of kingship around the world by noting that while
it was true that monarchy had lost its role in
many countries, in Nepal the institution was still
necessary and still served a function. That other
countries no longer have kings does not in and
of itself mean that Nepal should not have a king.
Shah responded to the criticism that he was proposing
merely technocratic solutions by drawing comparisons
with the West. Strong states, he argued, are strong
defenders of individual rights; he discussed the
US and the UK as examples of this. Competence
in administration is necessary to guarantee citizens’
welfare. As for non-elected officials being corrupt,
he argued that corruption is a universal problem,
but that appointed professionals have fewer compulsions
driving them toward corruption than politicians.
Finally, Shah reiterated his argument on the role
of Nepal’s monarchy, stating that its ongoing
evolution positioned it at this moment as necessary
in the Nepali state, particularly in its potential
capacity to provide strong leadership against
the Maoists.
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